

# **SOLIDARITY AND RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE\***

ANTHONY M. ABELA

“Conscious of its spiritual and moral heritage, the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values of human dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity ...” (Preamble, Charter Fundamental Rights of the Union, Draft Constitution of the European Union, 18<sup>th</sup> July 2003)

The Draft Constitution of the European Union (European Convention 2003) identifies a link between the Union’s spiritual heritage and solidarity. Although there is no explicit mention of God or the Christian religion, the Draft Constitution makes several references to “values” and to the multi-dimensional concept of “solidarity”. Possibly, as the representative of the Government of Malta to the Convention observes, “this sort of hidden presence of a superficially absent God is the best way for Christianity to be felt in the lay context of the European Convention” (Serracino Inglott 2003).

A graphic representation of Eurobarometer (European Commission 2004) country-aggregate data shows how differences in support for a Constitution are not unrelated to divergent approaches to solidarity. Generally, certain larger member countries favour a multi-speed Europe or a freedom to shape bonding-type or exclusive solidarities, whereas most of their smaller counterparts are against a multi-speed Europe and instead support inclusive or bridging solidarities. For our purposes, however, Eurobarometer surveys do not provide information on religion. The extent to which different types of solidarity are associated to the values of religion has still to be established [Figure 1].

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The European Values Study (1999/2000)<sup>1</sup> makes possible an analysis of the values of religion and solidarity. Here we test the hypothesis of an expected significant relationship between citizens' current religious and spiritual values and the practice of socio-economic solidarity at the individual, community and international levels. What is the relevance of the values of religion, measured at the individual level, for social order and the practice of solidarity in the European Union? Are there any significant differences or similarities between distinct cultural regions of the European Union, identified as North-Western, Eastern and Mediterranean countries of the European Union, on these issues? A sociological perspective seeks to complement and inform the political and legal approaches to solidarity.

## **Theory**

Sociologists distinguish between interdependent dimensions of religion and distinct modalities of solidarity. Originally, Durkheim observed how Mediterranean Catholicism in contrast to Nordic Protestantism has a positive impact on social integration. In his view, homogeneous traditional society is held together by the religious values of a mechanical solidarity. By contrast, people from heterogeneous modern societies holding a diversity of religious values shape their own morality or organic solidarities. Contemporary sociological theories (Fukuyama 1995: 28; Putnam 2000: 22), and empirical studies of social capital (Beugelsduk and

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<sup>1</sup>The European Values Study (EVS) was established in the late 1970s as a large-scale, cross-national, and longitudinal survey research programme on basic human values. Since the early 1980s the EVS carried out three waves of the survey. The third wave was carried out during 1999 and 2000 in over thirty countries. In all participant countries a random sample of over 1000 respondents was drawn from the total adult population, 18 years and older. A total of 39,303 respondents were obtained from 32 European countries. Specially trained interviewers carried out interviews in the homes of respondents. Comparable EVS data is available for all member countries of the European Union, except for Cyprus. The questionnaire was designed to identify moral and social values underlying European social and political institutions and to explore changing values on family, work, leisure, religious, political and social issues. The English version of the EVS questionnaire and the main findings are reproduced in the sourcebook of the third wave of the European Values Study (Halman 2001).

Smulders 2003) distinguish between ‘bridging’ and ‘bonding’ relationships or inclusive and exclusive solidarities. Similarly, Turner and Rojek (2001: 220) differentiate between ‘hot’ loyalties and ‘thick’ solidarities of traditional local societies from ‘cool’ loyalties and ‘thin’ solidarities of global cultures and cosmopolitan citizenship.

Accordingly, traditional societies are expected to favour bonding-type relationships and hot/thick solidarities between people holding similar values. In late modern individualised societies, however, people with diverse social qualities and values are more likely to shape bridging-type relationships and cool/thin solidarities with the wider community. In the foregoing analysis, the first type is identified as family- and locally-oriented solidarity, whereas the second type has the quality of global solidarity.

Working within a Durkheimian perspective, Charles Taylor (2002: 89ff) identifies three ideal types constituting successive phases but also coexisting modalities of the relation between religion and society. Firstly, a paleo-Durkheimian model, wherein people’s connection to the sacred entails their belonging to a church which, in principle, is co-extensive with society. Here people are forcibly integrated, connected with God in conformity to external demands. The inevitable counterforces generated in opposition to the Church are eventually reconciled into a ‘baroque’ compromise.

Secondly, a neo-Durkheimian model wherein individuals choose freely to belong to a denomination, connecting them to a more elusive church and a political entity, which in turn is entrusted to carry out God’s providential design. This model is held to be widespread in the protestant countries of north-western Europe. A neo-Durkheimian effect is also at work in countries like Poland and Ireland where national identity is fused with a confessional religion, requiring religion to perform an integrating function.

Thirdly, a post-Durkheimian model, widespread in our times, is marked by an expressivist attitude, wherein individuals shape their religious life and practices, and give sense to their particular self-understanding of spiritual development. New expressive

spiritualities introduce an unlimited pluralism, a diversity of spiritual identities, religious belongings and moral practices. In this way they constitute a major challenge to monolithic authority. The interrelated concerns of the old outlook are now seen to fall apart, and the spiritual is no longer intrinsically related to society. Thus, the shift towards individual emotive spiritualities undermines Durkheimian traditional society, and releases people into a fractured world of consumer culture.

In a post-Durkheimian or individualised society, the sacred is uncoupled from political allegiance, and the integrative function of religion is no longer in place. Foremost amongst the consequences of an expressivist culture, Taylor (2002: 107) expects to find an increase in the number of atheists and agnostics and a widening gamut of intermediate positions mixing elements of orthodox Christian dogmas with beliefs from eastern religions. The Christian belief in a personal God is replaced by a diffuse spirit or life force. In the process, the Christian faith is in the process of redefining and recomposing itself.

In fact, empirical studies give evidence of the advance of emotive religious individualism alongside the prolongation of church-directed religion. A diversity is observed between those who believe without belonging and others who belong without believing (Davie 1999). Certain Europeans hold a mix of traditional and unorthodox religious beliefs without necessarily belonging to a Church, whereas others belong without conforming to a church-directed morality. In many countries, institutional religion is being displaced by the multiple activities of individuals and church communities, ranging from new spiritualities to practical solidarity with illegal immigrants. It seems that the decline of a general identity-giving institutional regime, common to all institutions with a religious matrix, is being replaced by fragile service-giving institutionalism and individualised spiritualities (Harvieu-Léger 2003).

These considerations lead us to formulate three possible hypotheses on the relation between religion and society, at work in distinct cultural regions of the European Union. Firstly, in traditional

societies, religion is intrinsically related to social order. A strong church-directed religion is accompanied by an equally high social solidarity. Remnants of this model are expected to be found in Catholic Mediterranean countries.

Secondly, in 'mixed' traditional-individualised societies, religious values have a positive impact on society. Individuals voluntarily choose to belong to a diversity of religious denominations, constituting a range of value-systems, thereby promoting a collective social and moral order, or social solidarity.

Finally, in individualised societies, religion is dissociated from political power and society. Institutional religion is displaced by a plurality of emotive spiritualities, and there is no exclusively religious way to maintain solidarity. Different modalities of solidarity are no longer necessarily dependent on the values of church-directed religion. Although this model increasingly applies all over Europe, it coexists in combination with other models, depending on a country's cultural heritage and the extent of individualisation in a particular society.

### **European Values Study**

This paper undertakes an analysis of the values of religion and solidarity in the enlarged European Union of 2004, grouped into North-Western (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom), Eastern (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and Southern or Mediterranean (Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain) regions. The data for this study consist of a random sample of 31,107 respondents from 24 countries. In the foregoing analysis all represented countries are assigned an equal weighting of 1000 respondents each. Various publications have since reported research findings for the separate countries and comparative studies are in preparation. Publications on values in Mediterranean countries include studies on Malta (Abela 2000), Italy (Gubert ed. 2000) and Spain (Elzo et Orizo eds. 2000).

Comparative studies of European values have identified postmaterialism and individualisation as two main and interrelated trends to explain change in values. In the first modality, once material needs are met and there is a sense of security, people start to challenge traditional moral positions and instead emphasise aspirations of autonomy, self-expression and community participation. In the second modality, individuals want to decide for themselves what is good and bad, and to direct their own lives, rather than allowing their values and behaviour to be determined by some higher, often a religious, authority. (Bréchon et al. 2002: 177ff, Ester et al. 1993).

Here, as in earlier European studies, people's values are organised into materialist-postmaterialist and traditional-individualised value orientations. A materialism-postmaterialism index is constructed from the battery of questions designed by Inglehart (1990, 1997). Respondents were requested to identify what they consider to be the first and second aims for the coming ten years in their country, from a list of four. On this basis respondents choosing two materialist qualities are identified as materialists, those choosing two post-materialist values are post-materialists, whereas those choosing a mix of one materialist and one post-materialist value are termed 'mixed' materialists/post-materialists.

Similarly, an index of individualisation is obtained from Rokeach's battery of questions. Factor analysis differentiates between the newly aspired-to qualities of independence, determination and perseverance, responsibility, unselfishness, imagination, tolerance and respect in contrast to conventional society-oriented and materialist qualities of obedience, religious faith, good manners, thrift or saving money and things and hard work. As in earlier studies of European (Harding *et al.* 1986) and Maltese values (Abela 1991, 2000), respondents choosing at least three out of five conventional values are identified as 'traditional' whereas those choosing at least four out of six post-traditional qualities are identified as 'individualised'. Respondents opting for a mix of traditional and post-traditional qualities are identified as 'mixed.' On this basis respondents are recognized as 'traditional', 'mixed' or 'individualised' depending on their value options. The

measurement of individualisation and postmaterialism makes possible the comparison between social groups, societies and countries.

## **RESULTS**

### **Individualisation**

Results show how the North-Western region of the European Union is predominantly individualised and postmaterialist. By contrast, the Eastern and Southern regions are in the main traditional. Materialism, however, is higher in the East than in the South. Within the Mediterranean region, people in Italy and Spain are the most individualised and post-materialist, whereas their counterparts in Portugal and Malta are predominantly traditional and materialist. The highest proportion of mixed traditional-individualist and materialist-postmaterialist is obtained in Greece. [Figure 2, Table 1].

### **Religious values**

The Values Study measured the social and personal dimensions of religion. Social dimensions include respondents' belonging to a Church or denomination, marking important events in life with religious services, confidence in the Church and satisfaction with its teachings, attendance at religious services, membership in religious organisations and doing unpaid work for a Church organisation. Personal dimensions include belief in God, spending time in prayer and deriving comfort and strength from religion. Dimensions having both a personal and social quality include adherence to orthodox religious beliefs, importance of religion in life, the sharing of religious beliefs for a successful marriage, and priority of religious education for the raising of children.

On all religious dimensions, the Mediterranean region obtains higher scores than either the North-Western or the Eastern region. Thus, a greater majority belong to a Church or denomination and participate regularly in religious services. They also hold higher

levels of orthodox religious belief, and give greater importance to religion in life. [Tables 2a-2c]

In sharp contrast to the North-Western and the Eastern regions, the majority of respondents from the Mediterranean still hold to orthodox beliefs, and believe in a personal God. Moreover, very few from the Mediterranean region think that there is no spirit, God or life force. Within the Mediterranean area, the Greek Orthodox have the strongest beliefs, whereas people in Spain have the lowest belief in a personal God. [Table 3, Figure 3]

Irrespective of their attendance at religious services, a majority in Italy, Portugal, Greece, Malta but fewer in Spain, claim to be religious. In all Mediterranean countries the greatest majority believe in God. Much fewer, however, believe in life after death, heaven, hell, and much less in sin. Similar findings suggest that a paleo-Durkheimian model, wherein the social is related to the sacred, is still partially at work in the Mediterranean region.

Notwithstanding the above regional differences, a number of similar patterns can be observed all over Europe. In all regions, without distinctions respondents report much higher attendance at religious services when they were 12 years old than at present. Irrespective of their participation at religious services, the majority claim to be religious, believe in God and spend some time in prayer or meditation. Fewer respondents, however, are satisfied with the teachings of their church on individual and moral problems, family life and least of all on social issues. By contrast, higher percentages are satisfied with their church's response to spiritual needs. Overall, however, institutional religion has less importance in life, and fewer respondents find important the sharing of religious beliefs for a successful marriage, or give priority to the education of children in religious faith.

As expected, the generations of Europeans who were born before the first and second World Wars are more religious than their younger counterparts. Thus, whereas the majority of the younger generation claim to belong to a Church or a religious denomination, and would like to mark major events in life by a religious service,

much fewer have confidence in the Church or are satisfied with the teachings of their Church. The younger generations are also more likely to have poor attendance at religious services and lower levels of unpaid voluntary work in religious organisations. They report lower levels of adherence to orthodox religious beliefs than their older generations, but score higher on non-Christian beliefs. Similarly, significantly lower percentages of the younger generation than their older counterparts find religion to be important in life, give less importance to the sharing of religious beliefs for a successful marriage, and a lower priority to the education of children in religious faith. In the same way, the younger generation is replacing orthodox faith in a personal God of earlier generations with a belief in a spirit or life force, possibly shaping their own emotive spiritualities, and becoming increasingly indifferent to an externally defined image of God. As can be expected, respondents with a traditional value orientation are more likely to believe in a personal God. By contrast, individualised respondents are more likely to believe in a spirit or life force, or do not profess any religious belief at all. [Tables 4a-4c]

It seems that social and institutional religion is increasingly being confronted by individualised beliefs and spiritualities. The above findings, however, support the view that all over Europe, with no exception to the Mediterranean region, emotive spiritualities and a servicing religious activity in response to individuals' needs co-exist with institutional church religion.

### **Politics and religion**

All over Europe there is a general consensus that religion should be unhooked from politics. In fact, in all regions of the European Union under consideration, the majority disagree that 'politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office', or that 'it would be better if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office'. Instead the majority are of the opinion that religious leaders should neither influence government decisions nor how people vote during elections. As can be expected, the younger generation and non-believers hold stronger to these views than their older and religious counterparts.

The slightly greater support for confessional politics obtained in the Mediterranean region is explained by the fact that a higher percentage of respondents from the Greek Orthodox Church and from Catholic Malta, in particular, prefer religiously-inspired political leaders. At the same time, however, the greatest opposition to any religious influence in politics, and not least against any religious interference during elections, is recorded in Malta. Similar attitudes are a reasonable reaction of a strongly traditional country against the Church's political interference during the recent past. [Tables 5a-5c]

### **Socio-economic solidarities**

The Values Study asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they are concerned about the living conditions of other people, and if they are actually prepared to do something to improve others' respective living conditions. These significant others ranged from their immediate family, people in their neighbourhood, the elderly, immigrants, sick and disabled people, Europeans and humankind in general. Overall in the European countries under consideration, greatest social concern is obtained for the immediate family, the elderly, the sick and the disabled, and the unemployed. Less concern is shown towards people in the neighbourhood, humankind, fellow countrymen, people in the region, immigrants, and least of all other Europeans. People from the Mediterranean region express the highest level of concern closely followed by the North-Western and the Eastern European regions. [Tables 6a-6d]

A factor analysis identifies three components of socio-economic solidarity. The first brings together respondents' concern about the living conditions of members of their immediate family, people in their neighbourhood and in the community, and has the quality of 'local solidarity'. The second factor has the character of social justice towards the elderly, sick, disabled and unemployed people or 'social solidarity', and the third factor brings together concern about the living conditions of non-nationals, including immigrants, humankind and Europeans, or 'global solidarity'.

Results show how the older generations and the religious show greater social solidarity towards people in need than their younger and non-religious counterparts. Older and younger generations as well as religious and non-religious people are equally concerned about the well-being of their immediate family. On the other hand, non-religious people show greater solidarity towards foreigners than their religious counterparts, in their concern about the well-being of immigrants, humankind and Europeans.

Relative to Roman Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox believers, Muslims stand out for their greater willingness to help immigrants. They are, however, less willing to help neighbours, elderly, sick and disabled people in their country of residence, than members of other religions.

Individualisation and postmaterialism have differential impact on different types of solidarity. On the one hand, traditionalism has a greater support for family, local community and social solidarity, whereas individualisation favours global solidarity. On the other hand, post-materialists express greater willingness to help all social groupings, including their family, people with special needs and immigrants in particular, than their materialist counterparts.

### **Solidarity and religion**

In this section we test the hypothesis of an expected uncoupling of socio-economic solidarity from religion. To what extent, if at all, are traditional church-directed religion or its alternative individualised emotive spiritualities necessary for the upkeep and development of family, local community, social and global solidarities? Are there secular alternatives to religion to explain different types of solidarity? Is a post-Durkheimian model adequate to explain the workings of an expected non-relationship between solidarity and religion all over the European Union or is there a need to employ differential models for distinct regions in Europe?

To answer these questions three separate multiple regression analyses are applied to the three components of socio-economic solidarity as dependent variables, to be explained in terms of

traditional and individualised religion, individualisation and postmaterialism, but also in terms of age and gender and the importance individuals attach to politics, family, leisure, work, friendships, as independent variables. Traditional religion is measured in terms of respondents' belonging to a church or denomination and their attendance at religious services. Individualised religion is measured by the importance of God in life; and individualised spiritualities in terms of respondents' belief in a spirit or life force. To test an expected universality of the post-Durkheimian model requiring no significant relationship between religion and solidarity, we control for the separate regions in Europe. [Table 7]

Results show how in the European Union, generally, all forms of solidarity are associated with individualised religion or the importance people attach to God in their life. But whereas local, family and community solidarity is significantly related to an individualised religiosity, social solidarity is dependent on both institutional and individualised religion. With the exception of social solidarity, local and global solidarities do not seem to be dependent on institutional religion.

As can be expected, all over Europe, family solidarity has a significant relationship with old age and the importance attached to the family. The fact that all over Europe, local and social solidarity are strongly related to old age suggests that in the near future, the displacement of older by younger generations will be accompanied by a diminishing importance of family and social solidarity.

In the north-western region of the European Union, family solidarity obtains a strong negative relationship with individualisation. It is also negatively related to the importance of religion and leisure but positively related to friendships and politics. It has also a relationship with the female gender.

In the Mediterranean region, family and local community solidarity is negatively related to individualisation and postmaterialism. However, it is positively related to friendship but negatively related with the importance of work in life. This suggests that families and

communities find greatest support in friendships, moderate work activities, and the upkeep of traditional values.

All over Europe, global solidarity obtains a strong and significant relationship with individualisation, postmaterialism, and the importance of politics, friendship and acquaintances, and a negative relationship with the importance of the family. The greater importance attached to politics over and above individualised spiritualities and institutional religion suggests that in Europe, generally, far from being under the influence of religion and the traditional family, global solidarity is shaped by politics, individualisation and postmaterialism, variously referred to as thin-cool solidarities and ‘bridging’ or inclusive solidarities.

## **Conclusion**

The foregoing analysis has identified common value orientations situating countries, as well as individuals of different generations, religious and social groupings on the map of European Values. The European Union is a mixed society, wherein a diversity of individuals from countries with distinct cultural and religious traditions shape distinct value systems, ranging from extreme traditionalism and materialism to high individualisation and postmaterialism. Countries in the north-western region of the European Union are predominantly individualised and post-materialist. Traditionalism and materialism is widespread in the eastern countries of the European Union. Mixed traditionalism, individualisation and postmaterialism is most common in the Mediterranean region. In certain countries of the Mediterranean region, Greece and Malta in particular, the prolongation of institutional religion alongside new individualised spiritualities, seems to have a hold over society and the polity. In this respect, a paleo-Durkheimian model is still useful to understand the workings of a formerly church-directed religion on social solidarity.

All over Europe, however, with no exception to the Mediterranean region, there is a general consensus that institutional religion should be unhooked from political power. It seems that the social and public manifestation of religion are increasingly being

displaced by individualised beliefs and spiritualities. Results from the EVS data, however, support the view that all over Europe emotive spiritualities and a servicing religious activity in response to individuals' needs co-exist with institutional church religion.

On the one hand, the individualisation thesis or a post-Durkheimian model explains the uncoupling of religion from politics. On the other hand, however, the continuing impact of institutional religion on social solidarity needs to be explained by a neo-Durkheimian model. This is because politics is only one component of society. The achieved autonomy of politics and the polity from direct religious influence, does not rule out the impact of religion in the promotion of solidarity and the maintenance of social order. In fact, the analysis EVS data give evidence on how all over Europe social solidarity is directly related to institutional religion. Moreover, individualised religion, measured in terms of the importance of God in life, is not unrelated to all forms of solidarity.

The differentiation of solidarity into three components suggests a differential impact of religion in contemporary society. On the one hand, traditional institutional religion is still important for the upkeep of social solidarity; whereas individualised spiritualities are important for family and local community solidarity. On the other hand, however, institutional religion is less important for the development of global solidarities. In contemporary society the task for the promotion of global solidarity, primarily falls on social and political activists, not least those inspired by the values of religion or spirituality, working within individualised and postmaterialist democratic social networks.

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**Table 1. Individualisation and postmaterialism in EU Regions**

	N/West	East	South	EU
	%	%	%	%
Traditional	29	45	48	38
Mixed	34	37	35	35
Individualised	38	18	17	28
Materialists	20	35	26	26
Mixed	62	58	58	60
Post-materialists	18	7	16	14

**Table 2a. Institutional religion in EU Regions**

	N/West	East	South	EU
	%	%	%	%
Belong to church / religion	67	62	90	70
Religious service birth	64	68	82	69
Religious service marriage	67	68	85	71
Religious service death	75	75	88	77
Confidence in church	43	49	66	50
- Individual needs & moral problems	31	42	50	38
- family life	27	39	45	34
- social problems	22	22	37	25
- spiritual needs	49	61	65	56

**Table 2b. Religious Belief in EU Regions**

	N/West	East	South	EU
Belief in God	66	64	90	70
Belief in life after death	43	41	53	44
Belief in hell	23	27	44	28
Belief in heaven	39	33	56	41
Belief in sin	46	58	69	54
Belief in telepathy	34	40	30	35
Belief in reincarnation	16	21	17	18

**Table 2c. Religious practice in EU Regions**

	N/West	East	South	EU
Are you religious person	56	64	76	62
Importance religion in life	42	44	72	48
Comfort and strength from religion	44	48	72	51
Prayer and meditation	57	57	73	60
Attend at least once month, when 12	54	50	82	58
Attend at least once a month	28	30	54	34
Spend time in church, once a month	20	18	35	23
Member religious organisation	23	8	10	16
Work religious organisation	8	5	7	7
Religious beliefs marriage	16	18	33	20
Religious faith child's education	17	20	37	22

**Table 3. Religion and Generations**

	GENERATIONS			
	Pre-WW2	Post-WW2	Post-1960s	All
	%	%	%	%
<i>Belong to church / religion</i>	78	69	65	70
Attend at least once month, when 12	70	58	50	59
Attend at least once a month	46	32	25	34
Confidence in church	62	46	41	50
<i>Church teaching adequate on:</i>				
- Individual needs & moral problems	49	35	30	38
- family life	44	31	27	34
- social problems	33	23	19	25
- spiritual needs	63	54	51	56
Prayer and meditation	70	59	53	60

Are you religious person	73	61	53	62
Comfort and strength from religion	64	49	40	51
Importance religion in life	62	45	38	48

**Table 4a. Statement of belief and EU region**

	REGION			All
	N/West	East	South	
<b>Belief in:</b>	%	%	%	%
Personal God	34	34	70	41
Spirit or life force	36	39	20	34
Don't know what to think	14	16	7	13
No spirit God or life force	15	12	3	12

**Table 4b. Statement of belief and Generations**

	Generations			
	pre-WW2	post-WW2	post-1960s	All
<b>Belief in:</b>	%	%	%	%
Personal God	51	39	34	41
Spirit or life force	28	36	37	34
Don't know what to think	11	13	16	13
No spirit God or life force	10	13	14	12

**Table 4c. Statement of belief and value orientation**

	Value orientation			All
	traditional	Mixed	Individualised	
<b>Belief in:</b>	%	%	%	%
Personal God	52	39	29	41
Spirit or life force	25	36	43	34
Don't know what to think	13	14	13	13
No spirit God or life force	9	12	16	12

**Table 5a. Politics and Religion in the EU**

	REGION		All	
	N/West	East	South	
	%	%	%	%
Unbelievers in God unfit for political office	10	15	26	15
Better if stronger religious believers hold public office	17	26	34	23
Religious leaders should not influence government decisions	68	70	68	69
Religious leaders should not influence voters in elections	74	77	77	76

**Table 5b. Politics and Religion**

	Roman			
	Catholic	Orthodox	Protestant	Muslim
	%	%	%	%
Unbelievers in God unfit for political office	18	45	11	27
Better if stronger religious believers hold public office	30	47	21	42
Religious leaders should not influence government decisions	69	59	63	54
Religious leaders should not influence voters in elections	76	75	72	57

**Table 5c. Politics, religion and Generations**

	generations			All
	pre- WW2 %	post- WW2 %	post- 1960s %	%
Unbelievers in God unfit for political office	21	13	10	14
Better if stronger religious believers hold public office	33	20	16	23
Religious leaders should not influence government decisions	66	71	69	69
Religious leaders should not influence voters in elections	73	78	76	76

**Table 6a. Socio-economic Solidarity in EU regions**

	EU REGION			All
	N/West %	East %	South %	%
<i>Family/local solidarity:</i>				
Immediate family	78	83	92	82
Neighbourhood people	34	25	35	31
People own region	21	16	26	20
Fellow countrymen	22	23	31	24
<i>Social solidarity:</i>				
Elderly	62	56	75	63
Sick and disabled	56	53	71	58
Unemployed	36	42	53	41
<i>Global solidarity:</i>				
Humankind	28	18	37	26
Immigrants	20	9	26	18
Europeans	13	9	18	13

**Table 6b. Socio-economic Solidarity and Generations**

	<b>Generations</b>			
	<b>pre- WW2</b>	<b>post- WW2</b>	<b>Post- 1960s</b>	<b>All</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<i>Family/local solidarity:</i>				
Immediate family	82	83	83	82
Neighbourhood people	36	32	26	31
People own region	25	21	16	20
Fellow countrymen	26	25	20	24
<i>Social solidarity:</i>				
Elderly	73	63	52	63
Sick and disabled	64	59	51	58
Unemployed	47	42	34	41
<i>Global solidarity:</i>				
Humankind	25	27	26	26
Immigrants	17	19	17	18
Europeans	14	14	11	13

**Table 6c. Socio-economic Solidarity and Religiosity**

	<b>Are you a religious person</b>			
	<b>Religious Person</b>	<b>Not religious Person</b>	<b>Convinced Atheist</b>	<b>All</b>
	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>%</b>
<i>Family/local solidarity:</i>				
Immediate family	84	80	80	83
Neighbourhood people	34	27	28	32
People own region	23	16	21	21
Fellow countrymen	26	19	24	24
<i>Social solidarity:</i>				
Elderly	68	55	53	63

Sick and disabled	63	50	50	59
Unemployed	45	34	41	42
<i>Global solidarity:</i>				
Humankind	28	22	30	27
Immigrants	19	15	22	18
Europeans	14	10	16	13

**Table 6d. Socio-economic Solidarity and Individualisation**

	Traditional	Mixed	Individualised	All
	%	%	%	%
<i>Family/local solidarity:</i>				
Immediate family	85	82	78	82
Neighbourhood people	34	30	29	31
People own region	22	19	19	20
Fellow countrymen	24	24	24	24
<i>Social solidarity:</i>				
Elderly	65	63	59	63
Sick and disabled	59	58	57	58
Unemployed	43	41	39	41
<i>Global solidarity:</i>				
Humankind	22	26	32	26
Immigrants	15	17	23	18
Europeans	12	12	15	13

**Table 7. Regression analyses for solidarities in the EU**

<b>Dependent variable*</b>	<b>Type of solidarity</b>		
	<b>Local/ family</b>	<b>Social</b>	<b>Global</b>
<i>Independent Variables:</i>			
Individualisation	-0.21	Ns	0.31
Post-materialism	-0.13	0.06	0.28
Importance of God in life	0.24	0.18	0.11
Belong to Church/religion	Ns	0.15	Ns
religion important	Ns	0.21	0.10
family important	0.23	0.14	-0.05
leisure important	-0.09	0.05	Ns
friendship important	0.07	Ns	0.23
work important	0.04	0.13	Ns
politics important	Ns	0.14	0.39
Age years old	0.19	0.33	Ns
Gender M/F	0.05	0.15	Ns

\* standardised Beta coefficients,  $p < .005$ ; ns = not significant

# Constitution and two-speed Europe




Figure 1.

Source: Flash Eurobarometer (159), February 2004.

## Individualisation and Post-materialism in the EU




Figure 2.

Source: European Values Study 1999/2000

# Institutional-Individualised religion in the EU




Figure 3.

Source: European Values Study 1999/2000

## Individualised spiritualities in the EU




Figure 4.

Source: European Values Study 1999/2000

## Social Solidarity and institutional religion




Figure 5.

Source: European Values Study 1999/2000

# Global Solidarity and Politics in the EU




Figure 6.

Source: European Values Study 1999/2000