COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 1
SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION 365.11
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY 
REGULATIONS
*
LEGAL NOTICE 156 of 2001.
Citation.
Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Regulations.
Interpretation.
Cap. 365.
"Treaty" means the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
signed by Malta in New York on the 24th September, 1996.
Text of Treaty.
the Resolution of the House of Representatives dated
2nd March, 2001 and passed on 21st March, 2001 is
being published as Schedule 1.
( b ) For the purpose of article 3(4) of the Act, the Treaty is
published in the English Language in Schedule 2.
Prohibition of any 
nuclear weapon 
test explosion or 
any other nuclear 
explosion.
4. Notwithstanding any other law -
( a ) the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion
or any other nuclear explosion; or
( b ) the causing, encouraging, or in any way participating
in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion,
by any person in Malta or by any citizen or permanent resident of
Malta, whether in Malta or elsewhere, is prohibited.
Penalty.
regulations shall, on conviction, be liable to a term of
imprisonment not exceeding five years and to a fine ( multa ) not
exceeding fifty thousand liri, without prejudice to any higher
punishment which may be inflicted under any other law.
*Not yet in force.
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SCHEDULE 1
Regulation 3( a )
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MALTA
2 March, 2001
The Minister of Foreign Affairs proposes that the House of Representatives,
Having considered that on 24 September, 1996 Malta signed the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at New York, USA;
Having considered that on ratifying this Treaty, Malta would join sixty nine
countries which have ratified this Treaty, regarded as the cornerstone in the ban of
nuclear tests and proliferation of nuclear arms;
By virtue of article 3(1)( c ) and (2)( b ) of the Ratification of Treaties Act, (Cap.
304) and article 3(2) of the National Interest (Enabling Powers) Act (Cap. 365);
Resolves to authorise the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty and that Malta becomes a member of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty Organisation when the Treaty comes into force.
(sgd.) JOE BORG
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 3
SCHEDULE 2
Regulation 3( b )
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Treaty (hereinafter referred to as "the States Parties"),
Welcoming  the international agreements and other positive measures of recent
years in the field of nuclear disarmament, including reductions in arsenals of nuclear
weapons, as well as in the field of the prevention of nuclear proliferation in all its
aspects,
Underlining  the importance of the full and prompt implementation of such
agreements and measures,
Convinced  that the present international situation provides an opportunity to take
further effective measures towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation
of nuclear weapons in all its aspects, and  declaring  their intention to take such
measures,
Stressing  therefore the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to
reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those
weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
Recognizing  that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other
nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of
nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear
weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation in all its aspects,
Further recognizing  that an end to all such nuclear explosions will thus constitute
a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear
disarmament,
Convinced  that the most effective way to achieve an end to nuclear testing is
through the conclusion of a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable
comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, which has long been one of the highest
priority objectives of the international community in the field of disarmament and
non-proliferation,
Noting  the aspirations expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty Banning
Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water to seek
to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,
Noting also  the views expressed that this Treaty could contribute to the protection
of the environment,
Affirming  the purpose of attracting the adherence of all States to this Treaty and its
objective to contribute effectively to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear
weapons in all its aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to the
enhancement of international peace and security,
Have agreed  as follows:
ARTICLE I.
BASIC OBLIGATIONS
1. Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such
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nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
2. Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing
encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon
test explosion or any other nuclear explosion.
ARTICLE II.
THE ORGANIZATION
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties hereby establish the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban
Treaty Organization (hereinafter referred to as "the Organization") to achieve the
object and purpose of this Treaty, to ensure the implementation of its provisions,
including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a
forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties.
2. All States Parties shall be members of the Organization. A State Party shall
not be deprived of its membership in the Organization.
3. The seat of the Organization shall be Vienna, Republic of Austria.
4. There are hereby established as organs of the Organization: the Conference
of the States Parties, the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat, which
shall include the International Data Centre.
5. Each State Party shall cooperate with the Organization in the exercise of its
functions in accordance with this Treaty. States Parties shall consult, directly among
themselves, or through the Organization or other appropriate international
procedures, including procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in
accordance with its Charter, on any matter which may be raised relating to the object
and purpose, or the implementation of the provisions, of this Treaty.
6. The Organization shall conduct its verification activities provided for under
this Treaty in the least intrusive manner possible consistent with the timely and
efficient accomplishment of their objectives. It shall request only the information
and data necessary to fulfil its responsibilities under this Treaty. It shall take every
precaution to protect the confidentiality of information on civil and military
activities and facilities coming to its knowledge in the implementation of this Treaty
and, in particular, shall abide by the confidentiality provisions set forth in this
Treaty.
7. Each State Party shall treat as confidential and afford special handling to
information and data that it receives in confidence from the Organization in
connection with the implementation of this Treaty. It shall treat such information
and data eXclusively in connection with its rights and obligations under this Treaty.
8. The Organization, as an independent body, shall seek to utilize existing
expertise and facilities, as appropriate, and to maximize cost efficiencies, through
cooperative arrangements with other international organizations such as the
Internationa1 Atomic Energy Agency. Such arrangements, excluding those of a
minor and normal commercial and contractual nature, shall be set out in agreements
to be submitted to the Conference of the States Parties for approval.
9. The costs of the activities of the Organization shall be met annually by the
States Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessments adjusted to
take into account differences in membership between the United Nations and the
Organization.
10. Financial contributions of States Parties to the Preparatory Commission
shall be deducted in an appropriate way from their contributions to the regular
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 5
budget.
11. A member of the Organization which is in arrears in the payment of its
assessed contribution to the Organization shall have no vote in the Organization if
the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it
for the preceding two full years. The Conference of the States Parties may,
nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is
due to conditions beyond the control of the member.
B. THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES
Composition, Procedures and Decision-making
12. The Conference of the States Parties (hereinafter referred to as "the
Conference") shall be composed of all States Parties. Each State Party shall have one
representative in the Conference, who may be accompanied by alternates and
advisers.
13. The initial session of the Conference shall be convened by the Depositary no
later than 30 days after the entry into force of this Treaty.
14. The Conference shall meet in regular sessions, which shall be held annually,
unless it decides otherwise.
15. A special session of the Conference shall be convened:
(a) When decided by the Conference;
(b) When requested by the Executive Council; or
(c) When requested by any State Party and supported by a majority of the
States Parties.
The special session shall be convened no later than 30 days after the
decision of the Conference, the request of the Executive Council, or the attainment
of the necessary support, unless specified otherwise in the decision or request.
16. The Conference may also be convened in the form of an Amendment
Conference, in accordance with Article VII.
17. The Conference may also be convened in the form of a Review Conference
in accordance with Article VIII.
18. Sessions shall take place at the seat of the Organization unless the
Conference decides otherwise.
19. The Conference shall adopt its rules of procedure. At the beginning of each
session, it shall elect its President and such other officers as may be required. They
shall hold office until a new President and other officers are elected at the next
session.
20. A majority of the States Parties shall constitute a quorum.
21. Each State Party shall have one vote.
22. The Conference shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a majority
of members present and voting. Decisions on matters of substance shall be taken as
far as possible by consensus. If consensus is not attainable when an issue comes up
for decision, the President of the Conference shall defer any vote for 24 hours and
during this period of deferment shall make every effort to facilitate achievement of
consensus, and shall report to the Conference before the end of this period. If
consensus is not possible at the end of 24 hours, the Conference shall take a decision
by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting unless specified otherwise in
this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or
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not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided
by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
23. When exercising its function under paragraph 26 (k), the Conference shall
take a decision to add any State to the list of States contained in Annex 1 to this
Treaty in accordance with the procedure for decisions on matters of substance set out
in paragraph 22. Notwithstanding paragraph 22, the Conference shall take decisions
on any other change to Annex 1 to this Treaty by consensus.
Powers and Functions
24. The Conference shall be the principal organ of the Organization. It shall
consider any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty, including
those relating to the powers and functions of the Executive Council and the
Technical Secretariat, in accordance with this Treaty. It may make recommendations
and take decisions on any questions, matters or issues within the scope of this Treaty
raised by a State Party or brought to its attention by the Executive Council.
25. The Conference shall oversee the implementation of, and review compliance
with, this Treaty and act in order to promote its object and purpose. It shall also
oversee the activities of the Executive Council and the Technical Secretariat and
may issue guidelines to either of them for the exercise of their functions.
26. The Conference shall:
(a) Consider and adopt the report of the Organization on the
implementation of this Treaty and the annual programme and budget of
the Organization, submitted by the Executive Council, as well as
consider other reports;
(b) Decide on the scale of financial contributions to be paid by States
Parties in accordance with paragraph 9;
(c) Elect the members of the Executive Council;
(d) Appoint the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat (hereinafter
referred to as "the Director-General");
(e) Consider and approve the rules of procedure of the Executive Council
submitted by the latter;
(f) Consider and review scientific and technological developments that
could affect the operation of this Treaty. In this context, the Conference
may direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory
Board to enable him or her, in the performance of his or her functions,
to render specialized advice in areas of science and technology relevant
to this Treaty to the Conference, to the Executive Council, or to States
Parties. In that case, the Scientific Advisory Board shall be composed of
independent experts serving in their individual capacity and appointed,
in accordance with terms of reference adopted by the Conference, on the
basis of their expertise and experience in the particular scientific fields
relevant to the implementation of this Treaty;
(g) Take the necessary measures to ensure compliance with this Treaty and
to redress and remedy any situation that contravenes the provisions of
this Treaty, in accordance with Article V;
(h) Consider and approve at its initial session any draft agreements,
arrangements, provisions, procedures, operational manuals, guidelines
and any other documents developed and recommended by the
Preparatory Commission;
(i) Consider and approve agreements or arrangements negotiated by the
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 7
Technical Secretariat with States Parties, other States and international
organizations to be concluded by the Executive Council on behalf of the
Organization in accordance with paragraph 38 (h);
(j) Establish such subsidiary organs as it finds necessary for the exercise of
its functions in accordance with this Treaty; and
(k) Update Annex 1 to this Treaty, as appropriate, in accordance with
paragraph 23.
C. THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
Composition, Procedure and Decision-making
27. The Executive Council shall consist of 51 members. Each State Party shall
have the right, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, to serve on the
Executive Council.
28. Taking into account the need for equitable geographical distribution, the
Executive Council shall comprise:
(a) Ten States Parties from Africa;
(b) Seven States Parties from Eastern Europe;
(c) Nine States Parties from Latin America and the Caribbean;
(d) Seven States Parties from the Middle East and South Asia;
(e) Ten States Parties from North America and Western Europe; and
(f) Eight States Parties from South-East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East.
All States in each of the above geographical regions are listed in Annex 1 to
this Treaty. Annex 1 to this Treaty shall be updated, as appropriate, by the
Conference in accordance with paragraphs 23 and 26 (k). It shall not be subject to
amendments or changes under the procedures contained in Article VII.
29. The members of the Executive Council shall be elected by the Conference.
In this connection, each geographical region shall designate States Parties from that
region for election as members of the Executive Council as follows:
(a) At least one-third of the seats allocated to each geographical region
shall be filled, taking into account political and security interests, by
States Parties in that region designated on the basis of the nuclear
capabilities relevant to the Treaty as determined by international data as
well as all or any of the following indicative criteria in the order of
priority determined by each region:
(i) Number of monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring
System;
(ii) Expertise and experience in monitoring technology; and
(iii) Contribution to the annual budget of the Organization;
(b) One of the seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled on
a rotational basis by the State Party that is first in the English
alphabetical order among the States Parties in that region that have not
served as members of the Executive Council for the longest period of
time since becoming States Parties or since their last term, whichever is
shorter. A State Party designated on this basis may decide to forgo its
seat. In that case, such a State Party shall submit a letter of renunciation
to the Director-General, and the seat shall be filled by the State Party
following next-in-order according to this sub-paragraph; and
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(c) The remaining seats allocated to each geographical region shall be filled
by States Parties designated from among all the States Parties in that
region by rotation or elections.
30. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one representative on the
Executive Council, who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers.
31. Each member of the Executive Council shall hold office from the end of the
session of the Conference at which that member is elected until the end of the second
regular annual session of the Conference thereafter, except that for the first election
of the Executive Council, 26 members shall be elected to hold office until the end of
the third regular annual session of the Conference, due regard being paid to the
established numerical proportions as described in paragraph 28.
32. The Executive Council shall elaborate its rules of procedure and submit
them to the Conference for approval.
33. The Executive Council shall elect its Chairman from among its members.
34. The Executive Council shall meet for regular sessions. Between regular
sessions it shall meet as may be required for the fulfilment of its powers and
functions.
35. Each member of the Executive Council shall have one vote.
36. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of procedure by a
majority of all its members. The Executive Council shall take decisions on matters of
substance by a two-thirds majority of all its members unless specified otherwise in
this Treaty. When the issue arises as to whether the question is one of substance or
not, that question shall be treated as a matter of substance unless otherwise decided
by the majority required for decisions on matters of substance.
Powers and Functions
37. The Executive Council shall be the executive organ of the Organization. It
shall be responsible to the Conference. It shall carry out the powers and functions
entrusted to it in accordance with this Treaty. In so doing, it shall act in conformity
with the recommendations, decisions and guidelines of the Conference and ensure
their continuous and proper implementation.
38. The Executive Council shall:
(a) Promote effective implementation of, and compliance with, this Treaty;
(b) Supervise the activities of the Technical Secretariat;
(c) Make recommendations as necessary to the Conference for
consideration of further proposals for promoting the object and purpose
of this Treaty;
(d) Cooperate with the National Authority of each State Party;
(e) Consider and submit to the Conference the draft annual programme and
budget of the Organization, the draft report of the Organization on the
implementation of this Treaty, the report on the performance of its own
activities and such other reports as it deems necessary or that the
Conference may request;
(f) Make arrangements for the sessions of the Conference, including the
preparation of the draft agenda;
(g) Examine proposals for changes, on matters of an administrative or
technical nature, to the Protocol or the Annexes thereto, pursuant to
Article VII, and make recommendations to the States Parties regarding
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 9
their adoption;
(h) Conclude, subject to prior approval of the Conference, agreements or
arrangements with States Parties, other States and international
organizations on behalf of the Organization and supervise their
implementation, with the exception of agreements or arrangements
referred to in sub-paragraph (i);
(i) Approve and supervise the operation of agreements or arrangements
relating to the implementation of verification activities with States
Parties and other States; and
(j) Approve any new operational manuals and any changes to the existing
operational manuals that may be proposed by the Technical Secretariat.
39. The Executive Council may request a special session of the Conference.
40. The Executive Council shall:
(a) Facilitate cooperation among States Parties, and between States Parties
and the Technical Secretariat, relating to the implementation of this
Treaty through information exchanges;
(b) Facilitate consultation and clarification among States Parties in
accordance with Article IV; and
(c) Receive, consider and take action on requests for, and reports on, on-
site inspections in accordance with Article IV.
41. The Executive Council shall consider any concern raised by a State Party
about possible non-compliance with this Treaty and abuse of the rights established
by this Treaty. In so doing, the Executive Council shall consult with the States
Parties involved and, as appropriate, request a State Party to take measures to redress
the situation within a specified time. To the extent that the Executive Council
considers further action to be necessary, it shall take, inter alia, one or more of the
following measures:
(a) Notify all States Parties of the issue or matter;
(b) Bring the issue or matter to the attention of the Conference;
(c) Make recommendations to the Conference or take action, as
appropriate, regarding measures to redress the situation and to ensure
compliance in accordance with Article V.
D. THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT
42. The Technical Secretariat shall assist States Parties in the implementation of
this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall assist the Conference and the Executive
Council in the performance of their functions. The Technical Secretariat shall carry
out the verification and other functions entrusted to it by this Treaty, as well as those
functions delegated to it by the Conference or the Executive Council in accordance
with this Treaty. The Technical Secretariat shall include, as an integral part, the
International Data Centre.
43. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with regard to verification of
compliance with this Treaty shall, in accordance with Article IV and the Protocol,
include  inter alia :
(a) Being responsible for supervising and coordinating the operation of the
International Monitoring System;
(b) Operating the International Data Centre;
(c) Routinely receiving, processing, analysing and reporting on
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International Monitoring System data;
(d) Providing technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and
operation of monitoring stations;
(e) Assisting the Executive Council in facilitating consultation and
clarification among States Parties;
(f) Receiving requests for on-site inspections and processing them,
facilitating Executive Council consideration of such requests, carrying
out the preparations for, and providing technical support during, the
conduct of on-site inspections, and reporting to the Executive Council;
(g) Negotiating agreements or arrangements with States Parties, other
States and international organizations and concluding, subject to prior
approval by the Executive Council, any such agreements or
arrangements relating to verification activities with States Parties or
other States; and
(h) Assisting the States Parties through their National Authorities on other
issues of verification under this Treaty.
44. The Technical Secretariat shall develop and maintain, subject to approval by
the Executive Council, operational manuals to guide the operation of the various
components of the verification regime, in accordance with Article IV and the
Protocol. These manuals shall not constitute integral parts of this Treaty or the
Protocol and may be changed by the Technical Secretariat subject to approval by the
Executive Council. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the States
Parties of any changes in the operational manuals.
45. The functions of the Technical Secretariat with respect to administrative
matters shall include:
(a) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme
and budget of the Organization;
(b) Preparing and submitting to the Executive Council the draft report of
the Organization on the implementation of this Treaty and such other
reports as the Conference or the Executive Council may request;
(c) Providing administrative and technical support to the Conference, the
Executive Council and other subsidiary organs;
(d) Addressing and receiving communications on behalf of the
Organization relating to the implementation of this Treaty; and
(e) Carrying out the administrative responsibilities related to any
agreements between the Organization and other international
organizations.
46. All requests and notifications by States Parties to the Organization shall be
transmitted through their National Authorities to the Director-General. Requests and
notifications shall be in one of the official languages of this Treaty. In response the
Director-General shall use the language of the transmitted request or notification.
47. With respect to the responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat for preparing
and submitting to the Executive Council the draft programme and budget of the
Organization, the Technical Secretariat shall determine and maintain a clear
accounting of all costs for each facility established as part of the International
Monitoring System. Similar treatment in the draft programme and budget shall be
accorded to all other activities of the Organization.
48. The Technical Secretariat shall promptly inform the Executive Council of
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any problems that have arisen with regard to the discharge of its functions that have
come to its notice in the performance of its activities and that it has been unable to
resolve through consultations with the State Party concerned.
49. The Technical Secretariat shall comprise a Director-General, who shall be
its head and chief administrative officer, and such scientific, technical and other
personnel as may be required. The Director-General shall be appointed by the
Conference upon the recommendation of the Executive Council for a term of four
years, renewable for one further term, but not thereafter. The first Director-General
shall be appointed by the Conference at its initial session upon the recommendation
of the Preparatory Commission.
50. The Director-General shall be responsible to the Conference and the
Executive Council for the appointment of the staff and for the organization and
functioning of the Technical Secretariat. The paramount consideration in the
employment of the staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be
the necessity of securing the highest standards of professional expertise, experience,
efficiency, competence and integrity. Only citizens of States Parties shall serve as
the Director-General, as inspectors or as members of the professional and clerical
staff. Due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a
geographical basis as possible. Recruitment shall be guided by the principle that the
staff shall be kept to the minimum necessary for the proper discharge of the
responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat.
51. The Director-General may, as appropriate, after consultation with the
Executive Council, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to
provide recommendations on specific issues.
52. In the performance of their duties, the Director-General, the inspectors, the
inspection assistants and the members of the staff shall not seek or receive
instructions from any Government or from any other source external to the
Organization. They shall refrain from any action that might reflect adversely on their
positions as international officers responsible only to the Organization. The
Director-General shall assume responsibility for the activities of an inspection team.
53. Each State Party shall respect the exclusively international character of the
responsibilities of the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and
the members of the staff and shall not seek to influence them in the discharge of their
responsibilities.
E. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
54. The Organization shall enjoy on the territory and in any other place under
the jurisdiction or control of a State Party such legal capacity and such privileges
and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of its functions.
55. Delegates of States Parties, together with their alternates and advisers,
representatives of members elected to the Executive Council, together with their
alternates and advisers, the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection
assistants and the members of the staff of the Organization shall enjoy such
privileges and immunities as are necessary in the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the Organization.
56. The legal capacity, privileges and immunities referred to in this Article shall
be defined in agreements between the Organization and the State Parties as well as in
an agreement between the Organization and the State in which the Organization is
seated. Such agreements shall be considered and approved in accordance with
paragraph 26 (h) and (l).
57. Notwithstanding paragraphs 54 and 55, the privileges and immunities
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enjoyed by the Director-General, the inspectors, the inspection assistants and the
members of the staff of the Technical Secretariat during the conduct of verification
activities shall be those set forth in the Protocol.
ARTICLE III.
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take
any necessary measures to implement its obligations under this Treaty. In particular,
it shall take any necessary measures:
(a) To prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any
other place under its jurisdiction as recognized by international law
from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this
Treaty;
(b) To prohibit natural and legal persons from undertaking any such activity
anywhere under its control; and
(c) To prohibit, in conformity with international law, natural persons
possessing its nationality from undertaking any such activity anywhere.
2. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States Parties and afford the
appropriate form of legal assistance to facilitate the implementation of the
obligations under paragraph 1.
3. Each State Party shall inform the Organization of the measures taken
pursuant to this Article.
4. In order to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, each State Party shall
designate or set up a National Authority and shall so inform the Organization upon
entry into force of the Treaty for it. The National Authority shall serve as the
national focal point for liaison with the Organization and with other States Parties.
ARTICLE IV.
VERIFICATION
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. In order to verify compliance with this Treaty, a verification regime shall be
established consisting of the following elements:
(a) An International Monitoring System;
(b) Consultation and clarification;
(c) On-site inspections; and
(d) Confidence-building measures.
At entry into force of this Treaty, the verification regime shall be capable of
meeting the verification requirements of this Treaty.
2. Verification activities shall be based on objective information, shall be
limited to the subject matter of this Treaty, and shall be carried out on the basis of
full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner
possible consistent with the effective and timely accomplishment of their objectives.
Each State Party shall refrain from any abuse of the right of verification.
3. Each State Party undertakes in accordance with this Treaty to cooperate,
through its National Authority established pursuant to Article III, paragraph 4, with
the Organization and with other States Parties to facilitate the verification of
compliance with this Treaty by,  inter alia :
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(a) Establishing the necessary facilities to participate in these verification
measures and establishing the necessary communication;
(b) Providing data obtained from national stations that are part of the
International Monitoring System;
(c) Participating, as appropriate, in a consultation and clarification process;
(d) Permitting the conduct of on-site inspections; and
(e) Participating, as appropriate, in confidence-building measures.
4. All States Parties, irrespective of their technical and financial capabilities,
shall enjoy the equal right of verification and assume the equal obligation to accept
verification.
5. For the purposes of this Treaty, no State Party shall be precluded from using
information obtained by national technical means of verification in a manner
consistent with generally recognized principles of international law, including that
of respect for the sovereignty of States.
6. Without prejudice to the right of States Parties to protect sensitive
installations, activities or locations not related to this Treaty, States Parties shall not
interfere with elements of the verification regime of this Treaty or with national
technical means of verification operating in accordance with paragraph 5.
7. Each State Party shall have the right to take measures to protect sensitive
installations and to prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not
related to this Treaty.
8. Moreover, all necessary measures shall be taken to protect the
confidentiality of any information related to civil and military activities and
facilities obtained during verification activities.
9. Subject to paragraph 8, information obtained by the Organization through
the verification regime established by this Treaty shall be made available to all
States Parties in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the
Protocol.
10. The provisions of this Treaty shall not be interpreted as restricting the
international exchange of data for scientific purposes.
11. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with
other States Parties in the improvement of the verification regime, and in the
examination of the verification potential of additional monitoring technologies such
as electromagnetic pulse monitoring or satellite monitoring, with a view to
developing, when appropriate, specific measures to enhance the efficient and cost-
effective verification of this Treaty. Such measures shall, when agreed, be
incorporated in existing provisions in this Treaty, the Protocol or as additional
sections of the Protocol, in accordance with Article VII, or, if appropriate, be
reflected in the operational manuals in accordance with Article II, paragraph 44.
12. The States Parties undertake to promote cooperation among themselves to
facilitate and participate in the fullest possible exchange relating to technologies
used in the verification of this Treaty in order to enable all States Parties to
strengthen their national implementation of verification measures and to benefit
from the application of such technologies for peaceful purposes.
13. The provisions of this Treaty shall be implemented in a manner which
avoids hampering the economic and technological development of the States Parties
for further development of the application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.
Verification Responsibilities of the Technical Secretariat
14 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
14. In discharging its responsibilities in the area of verification specified in this
Treaty and the Protocol, in cooperation with the State Parties the Technical
Secretariat shall, for the purpose of this Treaty:
(a) Make arrangements to receive and distribute data and reporting products
relevant to the verification of this Treaty in accordance with its
provisions, and to maintain a global communications infrastructure
appropriate to this task;
(b) Routinely through its International Data Centre, which shall in principle
be the focal point within the Technical Secretariat for data storage and
data processing:
(i) Receive and initiate requests for data from the International
Monitoring System;
(ii) Receive data, as appropriate, resulting from the process of
consultation and clarification, from on-site inspections, and from
confidence-building measures; and
(iii) Receive other relevant data from States Parties and international
organizations in accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol;
(c) Supervise, coordinate and ensure the operation of the International
Monitoring System and its component elements, and of the International
Data Centre, in accordance with the relevant operational manuals;
(d) Routinely process, analyse and report on International Monitoring
System data according to agreed procedures so as to permit the effective
international verification of this Treaty and to contribute to the early
resolution of compliance concerns;
(e) Make available all data, both raw and processed, and any reporting
products, to all States Parties, each State Party taking responsibility for
the use of International Monitoring System data in accordance with
Article II, paragraph 7, and with paragraphs 8 and 13 of this Article;
(f) Provide to all States Parties equal, open, convenient and timely access
to all stored data;
(g) Store all data, both raw and processed, and reporting products;
(h) Coordinate and facilitate requests for additional data from the
International Monitoring system;
(i) Coordinate requests for additional data from one State Party to another
State Party;
(j) Provide technical assistance in, and support for, the installation and
operation of monitoring facilities and respective communication means,
where such assistance and support are required by the State concerned;
(k) Make available to any State Party, upon its request, techniques utilized
by the Technical Secretariat and its International Data Centre in
compiling, storing, processing, analysing and reporting on data from the
verification regime; and
(l) Monitor, assess and report on the overall performance of the
International Monitoring System and of the Internationa1 Data Centre.
15. The agreed procedures to be used by the Technical Secretariat in discharging
the verification responsibilities referred to in paragraph 14 and detailed in the
Protocol shall be elaborated in the relevant operational manuals.
B. THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 15
16. The International Monitoring System shall comprise facilities for
seismological monitoring, radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories,
hydroacoustic monitoring, infrasound monitoring, and respective means of
communication, and shall be supported by the International Data Centre of the
Technical Secretariat.
17. The International Monitoring System shall be placed under the authority of
the Technical Secretariat. All monitoring facilities of the International Monitoring
System shall be owned and operated by the States hosting or otherwise taking
responsibility for them in accordance with the Protocol.
18. Each State Party shall have the right to participate in the international
exchange of data and to have access to all data made available to the International
Data Centre. Each State Party shall cooperate with the International Data Centre
through its National Authority.
Funding the Internationa1 Monitoring System
19. For facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring System and
specified in Tables 1-A, 2-A, 3 and 4 of Annex 1 to the Protocol, and for their
functioning, to the extent that such facilities are agreed by the relevant State and the
Organization to provide data to the International Data Centre in accordance with the
technical requirements of the Protocol and relevant operational manuals, the
Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant to Part I,
paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs of:
(a) Establishing any new facilities and upgrading existing facilities, unless
the State responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;
(b) Operating and maintaining International Monitoring System facilities,
including facility physical security if appropriate, and application of
agreed data authentication procedures;
(c) Transmitting International Monitoring System data (raw or processed)
to the International Data Centre by the most direct and cost-effective
means available, including, if necessary, via appropriate
communications nodes, from monitoring stations, laboratories,
analytical facilities or from national data centres; or such data
(including samples where appropriate) to laboratory and analytical
facilities from monitoring stations; and
(d) Analysing samples on behalf of the Organization.
20. For auxiliary network seismic stations specified in Table 1-B of Annex 1 to
the Protocol the Organization, as specified in agreements or arrangements pursuant
to Part I, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, shall meet the costs only of:
(a) Transmitting data to the International Data Centre;
(b) Authenticating data from such stations;
(c) Upgrading stations to the required technical standard, unless the State
responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself;
(d) If necessary, establishing new stations for the purposes of this Treaty
where no appropriate facilities currently exist, unless the State
responsible for such facilities meets these costs itself; and
(e) Any other costs related to the provision of data required by the
Organization as specified in the relevant operational manuals.
21. The Organization shall also meet the cost of provision to each State Party of
its requested selection from the standard range of International Data Centre reporting
16 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
products and services, as specified in Part I, Section F of the Protocol. The cost of
preparation and transmission of any additional data or products shall be met by the
requesting State Party.
22. The agreements or, if appropriate, arrangements concluded with States
Parties or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the
International Monitoring System shall contain provisions for meeting these costs.
Such provisions may include modalities whereby a State Party meets any of the costs
referred to in paragraphs 19 (a) and 20 (c) and (d) for facilities which it hosts or for
which it is responsible, and is compensated by an appropriate reduction in its
assessed financial contribution to the Organization. Such a reduction shall not
exceed 50 percent of the annual assessed financial contribution of a State Party, but
may be spread over successive years. A State Party may share such a reduction with
another State Party by agreement or arrangement between themselves and with the
concurrence of the Executive Council. The agreements or arrangements referred to
in this paragraph shall be approved in accordance with Article II, paragraphs 26 (h)
and 38 (i).
Changes to the International Monitoring System
23. Any measures referred to in paragraph 11 affecting the International
Monitoring System by means of addition or deletion of a monitoring technology
shall, when agreed, be incorporated into this Treaty and the Protocol pursuant to
Article VII, paragraphs 1 to 6.
24. The following changes to the International Monitoring System, subject to
the agreement of those States directly affected, shall be regarded as matters of an
administrative or technical nature pursuant to Article VII, paragraphs 7 and 8:
(a) Changes to the number of facilities specified in the Protocol for a given
monitoring technology; and
(b) Changes to other details for particular facilities as reflected in the
Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol (including, inter alia, State
responsible for the facility; location; name of facility; type of facility;
and attribution of a facility between the primary and auxiliary seismic
networks).
If the Executive Council recommends, pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 8
(d), that such changes be adopted, it shall as a rule also recommend pursuant to
Article VII, paragraph 8 (g) that such changes enter into force upon notification by
the Director-General of their approval.
25. The Director-General, in submitting to the Executive Council and States
Parties information and evaluation in accordance with Article VII, paragraph 8 (b),
shall include in the case of any proposal made pursuant to paragraph 24:
(a) A technical evaluation of the proposal;
(b) A statement on the administrative and financial impact of the proposal;
and
(c) A report on consultations with States directly affected by the proposal,
including indication of their agreement.
Temporary arrangements
26. In cases of significant or irretrievable breakdown of a monitoring facility
specified in the Tables of Annex 1 to the Protocol, or in order to cover other
temporary reductions of monitoring coverage, the Director-General shall, in
consultation and agreement with those States directly affected, and with the approval
of the Executive Council, initiate temporary arrangements of no more than one
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 17
year’s duration, renewable if necessary by agreement of the Executive Council and
of the States directly affected for another year. Such arrangements shall not cause
the number of operational facilities of the International Monitoring System to exceed
the number specified for the relevant network; shall meet as far as possible the
technical and operational requirements specified in the operational manual for the
relevant network; and shall be conducted within the budget of the Organization. The
Director-General shall furthermore take steps to rectify the situation and make
proposals for its permanent resolution. The Director-General shall notify all States
Parties of any decision taken pursuant to this paragraph.
Cooperating National Facilities
27. States Parties may also separately establish cooperative arrangements with
the Organization, in order to make available to the International Data Centre
supplementary data from national monitoring stations that are not formally part of
the International Monitoring System.
28. Such cooperative arrangements may be established as follows:
(a) Upon request by a State Party, and at the expense of that State, the
Technical Secretariat shall take the steps required to certify that a given
monitoring facility meets the technical and operational requirements
specified in the relevant operational manuals for an International
Monitoring System facility, and make arrangements for the
authentication of its data. Subject to the agreement of the Executive
Council, the Technical Secretariat shall then formally designate such a
facility as a cooperating national facility. The Technical Secretariat
shall take the steps required to revalidate its certification as appropriate;
(b) The Technical Secretariat shall maintain a current list of cooperating
national facilities and shall distribute it to all States Parties; and
(c) The International Data Centre shall call upon data from cooperating
national facilities, if so requested by a State Party, for the purposes of
facilitating consultation and clarification and the consideration of on-
site inspection requests, data transmission costs being borne by that
State Party.
The conditions under which supplementary data from such facilities are
made available, and under which the International Data Centre may request further
or expedited reporting, or clarifications, shall be elaborated in the operational
manual for the respective monitoring network.
C. CONSULTATION AND CLARIFICATION
29. Without prejudice to the right of any State Party to request an on-site
inspection, States Parties should, whenever possible, first make every effort to
clarify and resolve, among themselves or with or through the Organization, any
matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with the basic
obligations of this Treaty.
30. A State Party that receives a request pursuant to paragraph 29 directly from
another State Party shall provide the clarification to the requesting State Party as
soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48 hours after the request. The
requesting and requested States Parties may keep the Executive Council and the
Director-General informed of the request and the response.
31. A State Party shall have the right to request the Director-General to assist in
clarifying any matter which may cause concern about possible non-compliance with
the basic obligations of this Treaty. The Director-General shall provide appropriate
18 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
information in the possession of the Technical Secretariat relevant to such a concern.
The Director-General shall inform the Executive Council of the request and of the
information provided in response, if so requested by the requesting State Party.
32. A State Party shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain
clarification from another State Party on any matter which may cause concern about
possible non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty. In such a case, the
following shall apply:
(a) The Executive Council shall forward the request for clarification to the
requested State Party through the Director-General no later than 24
hours after its receipt;
(b) The requested State Party shall provide the clarification to the
Executive Council as soon as possible, but in any case no later than 48
hour after receipt of the request;
(c) The Executive Council shall take note of the clarification and forward it
to the requesting State Party no later than 24 hours after its receipt;
(d) If the requesting State Party deems the clarification to be inadequate, it
shall have the right to request the Executive Council to obtain further
clarification from the requested State Party.
The Executive Council shall inform without delay all other States Parties
about any request for clarification pursuant to this paragraph as well as any response
provided by the requested State Party.
33. If the requesting State Party considers the clarification obtained under
paragraph 32 (d) to be unsatisfactory, it shall have the right to request a meeting of
the Executive Council in which States Parties involved that are not members of the
Executive Council shall be entitled to take part. At such a meeting, the Executive
Council shall consider the matter and may recommend any measure in accordance
with Article V.
D. ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
Request for an On-Site Inspection
34. Each State Party has the right to request an on-site inspection in accordance
with the provisions of this Article and Part II of the Protocol in the territory or in any
other place under the jurisdiction or control of any State Party, or in any area beyond
the jurisdiction or control of any State.
35. The sole purpose of an on-site inspection shall be to clarify whether a
nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion has been carried out in
violation of Article I and, to the extent possible, to gather any facts which might
assist in identifying any possible violator.
36. The requesting State Party shall be under the obligation to keep the on-site
inspection request within the scope of this Treaty and to provide in the request
information in accordance with paragraph 37. The requesting State Party shall
refrain from unfounded or abusive inspection requests.
37. The on-site inspection request shall be based on information collected by the
International Monitoring System, on any relevant technical information obtained by
national technical means of verification in a manner consistent with generally
recognized principles of international law, or on a combination thereof. The request
shall contain information pursuant to Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol.
38. The requesting State Party shall present the on-site inspection request to the
Executive Council and at the same time to the Director-General for the latter to
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 19
begin immediate processing.
39. The Executive Council shall begin its consideration immediately upon
receipt of the on-site inspection request.
40. The Director-General, after receiving the on-site inspection request, shall
acknowledge receipt of the request to the requesting State Party within two hours
and communicate the request to the State Party sought to be inspected within six
hours. The Director-General shall ascertain that the request meets the requirements
specified in Part II, paragraph 41 of the Protocol, and, if necessary, shall assist the
requesting State Party in filing the request accordingly, and shall communicate the
request to the Executive Council and to all other States Parties within 24 hours.
41. When the on-site inspection request fulfils the requirements, the Technical
Secretariat shall begin preparations for the on-site inspection without delay.
42. The Director-General, upon receipt of an on-site inspection request referring
to an inspection area under the jurisdiction or control of a State Party, shall
immediately seek clarification from the State Party sought to be inspected in order to
clarify and resolve the concern raised in the request.
43. A State Party that receives a request for clarification pursuant to paragraph
42 shall provide the Director-General with explanations and with other relevant
information available as soon as possible, but no later than 72 hours after receipt of
the request for clarification.
44. The Director-General, before the Executive Council takes a decision on the
on-site inspection request, shall transmit immediately to the Executive Council any
additional information available from the International Monitoring System or
provided by any State Party on the event specified in the request, including any
clarification provided pursuant to paragraphs 42 and 43, as well as any other
information from within the Technical Secretariat that the Director-General deems
relevant or that is requested by the Executive Council.
45. Unless the requesting State Party considers the concern raised in the on-site
inspection request to be resolved and withdraws the request, the Executive Council
shall take a decision on the request in accordance with paragraph 46.
Executive Council Decisions
46. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the on-site inspection request
no later than 96 hours after receipt of the request from the requesting State Party.
The decision to approve the on-site inspection shall be made by at least 30
affirmative votes of members of the Executive Council. If the Executive Council
does not approve the inspection, preparations shall be stopped and no further action
on the request shall be taken.
47. No later than 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in
accordance with paragraph 46, the inspection team shall transmit to the Executive
Council, through the Director-General, a progress inspection report. The
continuation of the inspection shall be considered approved unless the Executive
Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the progress inspection report,
decides by a majority of all its members not to continue the inspection. If the
Executive Council decides not to continue the inspection, the inspection shall be
terminated, and the inspection team shall leave the inspection area and the territory
of the inspected State Party as soon as possible in accordance with Part II,
paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.
48. In the course of the on-site inspection, the inspection team may submit to the
Executive Council, through the Director-General, a proposal to conduct drilling. The
20 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
Executive Council shall take a decision on such a proposal no later than 72 hours
after receipt of the proposal. The decision to approve drilling shall be made by a
majority of all members of the Executive Council.
49. The inspection team may request the Executive Council, through the
Director-General, to extend the inspection duration by a maximum of 70 days
beyond the 60-day time-frame specified in Part II, paragraph 4 of the Protocol, if the
inspection team considers such an extension essential to enable it to fulfil its
mandate. The inspection team shall indicate in its request which of the activities and
techniques listed in Part II, paragraph 69 of the Protocol it intends to carry out
during the extension period. The Executive Council shall take a decision on the
extension request no later than 72 hours after receipt of the request. The decision to
approve an extension of the inspection duration shall be made by a majority of all
members of the Executive Council.
50. Any time following the approval of the continuation of the on-site
inspection in accordance with paragraph 47, the inspection team may submit to the
Executive Council, through the Director-General, a recommendation to terminate the
inspection. Such a recommendation shall be considered approved unless the
Executive Council, no later than 72 hours after receipt of the recommendation,
decides by a two-thirds majority of all its members not to approve the termination of
the inspection. In case of termination of the inspection, the inspection team shall
leave the inspection area and the territory of the inspected State Party as soon as
possible in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 109 and 110 of the Protocol.
51. The requesting State Party and the State Party sought to be inspected may
participate in the deliberations of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection
request without voting. The requesting State Party and the inspected State Party may
also participate without voting in any subsequent deliberations of the Executive
Council related to the inspection.
52. The Director-General shall notify all States Parties within 24 hours about
any decision by and reports, proposals, requests and recommendations to the
Executive Council pursuant to paragraphs 46 to 50.
Follow-up after Executive Council Approval of an On-Site Inspection
53. An on-site inspection approved by the Executive Council shall be conducted
without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General and in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. The inspection team
shall arrive at the point of entry no later than six days following the receipt by the
Executive Council of the on-site inspection request from the requesting State Party.
54. The Director-General shall issue an inspection mandate for the conduct of
the on-site inspection. The inspection mandate shall contain the information
specified in Part II, paragraph 42 of the Protocol.
55. The Director-General shall notify the inspected State Party of the inspection
no less than 24 hours before the planned arrival of the inspection team at the point of
entry, in accordance with Part II, paragraph 43 of the Protocol.
The Conduct of an On-Site Inspection
56. Each State Party shall permit the Organization to conduct an on-site
inspection on its territory or at places under its jurisdiction or control in accordance
with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol. However, no State Party shall
have to accept simultaneous on-site inspections on its territory or at places under its
jurisdiction or control.
57. In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and the Protocol, the
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 21
inspected State Party shall have:
(a) The right and the obligation to make every reasonable effort to
demonstrate its compliance with this Treaty and, to this end, to enable
the inspection team to fulfil its mandate;
(b) The right to take measures it deems necessary to protect national
security interests and to prevent disclosure of confidential information
not related to the purpose of the inspection;
(c) The obligation to provide access within the inspection area for the sole
purpose of determining facts relevant to the purpose of the inspection,
taking into account sub-paragraph (b) and any constitutional obligations
it may have with regard to proprietary rights or searches and seizures;
(d) The obligation not to invoke this paragraph or Part II, paragraph 88 of
the Protocol to conceal any violation of its obligations under Article I;
and
(e) The obligation not to impede the ability of the inspection team to move
within the inspection area and to carry out inspection activities in
accordance with this Treaty and the Protocol.
Access, in the context of an on-site inspection, means both the physical
access of the inspection team and the inspection equipment to, and the conduct of
inspection activities within, the inspection area.
58. The on-site inspection shall be conducted in the least intrusive manner
possible, consistent with the efficient and timely accomplishment of the inspection
mandate, and in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. Wherever
possible, the inspection team shall begin with the least intrusive procedures and then
proceed to more intrusive procedures only as it deems necessary to collect sufficient
information to clarify the concern about possible non-compliance with this Treaty.
The inspectors shall seek only the information and data necessary for the purpose of
the inspection and shall seek to minimize interference with normal operations of the
inspected State Party.
59. The inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team throughout the on-
site inspection and facilitate its task.
60. If the inspected State Party, acting in accordance with Part II, paragraphs 86
to 96 of the Protocol, restricts access within the inspection area, it shall make every
reasonable effort in consultations with the inspection team to demonstrate through
alternative means its compliance with this Treaty.
Observer
61. With regard to an observer, the following shall apply:
(a) The requesting State Party, subject to the agreement of the inspected
State Party, may send a representative, who shall be a national either of
the requesting State Party or of a third State Party, to observe the
conduct of the on-site inspection;
(b) The inspected State Party shall notify its acceptance or non-acceptance
of the proposed observer to the Director-General within 12 hours after
approval of the on-site inspection by the Executive Council;
(c) In case of acceptance, the inspected State Party shall grant access to the
observer in accordance with the Protocol;
(d) The inspected State Party shall, as a rule, accept the proposed observer,
but if the inspected State Party exercises a refusal, that fact shall be
22 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
recorded in the inspection report.
There shall be no more than three observers from an aggregate of requesting
States Parties.
Reports of an On-Site Inspection
62. Inspection reports shall contain:
(a) A description of the activities conducted by the inspection team;
(b) The factual findings of the inspection team relevant to the purpose of
the inspection;
(c) An account of the cooperation granted during the on-site inspection;
(d) A factual description of the extent of the access granted, including the
alternative means provided to the team, during the on-site inspection;
and
(e) Any other details relevant to the purpose of the inspection.
Differing observations made by inspectors may be attached to the report.
63. The Director-General shall make draft inspection reports available to the
inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide the
Director-General within 48 hours with its comments and explanations, and to
identify any information and data which, in its view, are not related to the purpose of
the inspection and should not be circulated outside the Technical Secretariat. The
Director-General shall consider the proposals for changes to the draft inspection
report made by the inspected State Party and shall wherever possible incorporate
them. The Director-General shall also annex the comments and explanations
provided by the inspected State Party to the inspection report.
64. The Director-General shall promptly transmit the inspection report to the
requesting State Party, the inspected State Party, the Executive Council and to all
other States Parties. The Director-General shall further transmit promptly to the
Executive Council and to all other States Parties any results of sample analysis in
designated laboratories in accordance with Part II, paragraph 104 of the Protocol,
relevant data from the International Monitoring System, the assessments of the
requesting and inspected States Parties, as well as any other information that the
Director-General deems relevant. In the case of the progress inspection report
referred to in paragraph 47, the Director-General shall transmit the report to the
Executive Council within the time-frame specified in that paragraph.
65. The Executive Council, in accordance with its powers and functions, shall
review the inspection report and any material provided pursuant to paragraph 64, and
shall address any concerns as to:
(a) Whether any non-compliance with this Treaty has occurred; and
(b) Whether the right to request an on-site inspection has been abused.
66. If the Executive Council reaches the conclusion, in keeping with its powers
and functions, that further action may be necessary with regard to paragraph 65, it
shall take the appropriate measures in accordance with Article V.
Frivolous or Abusive On-Site Inspection Requests
67. If the Executive Council does not approve the on-site inspection on the basis
that the on-site inspection request is frivolous or abusive, or if the inspection is
terminated for the same reasons, the Executive Council shall consider and decide on
whether to implement appropriate measures to redress the situation, including the
following:
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 23
(a) Requiring the requesting State Party to pay for the cost of any
preparations made by the Technical Secretariat;
(b) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to request an on-site
inspection for a period of time, as determined by the Executive Council;
and
(c) Suspending the right of the requesting State Party to serve on the
Executive Council for a period of time.
E. CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
68. In order to:
(a) Contribute to the timely resolution of any compliance concerns arising
from possible misinterpretation of verification data relating to chemical
explosions; and
(b) Assist in the calibration of the stations that are part of the component
networks of the International Monitoring System,
each State Party undertakes to cooperate with the Organization and with other States
Parties in implementing relevant measures as set out in Part III of the Protocol.
ARTICLE V.
MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE, 
INCLUDING SANCTIONS
1. The Conference, taking into account, inter alia, the recommendations of the
Executive Council, shall take the necessary measures, as set forth in paragraphs 2
and 3, to ensure compliance with this Treaty and to redress and remedy any situation
which contravenes the provisions of this Treaty.
2. In cases where a State Party has been requested by the Conference or the
Executive Council to redress a situation raising problems with regard to its
compliance and fails to fulfil the request within the specified time, the Conference
may, inter alia, decide to restrict or suspend the State Party from the exercise of its
rights and privileges under this Treaty until the Conference decides otherwise.
3. In cases where damage to the object and purpose of this Treaty may result
from non-compliance with the basic obligations of this Treaty, the Conference may
recommend to States Parties collective measures which are in conformity with
international law.
4. The Conference, or alternatively, if the case is urgent, the Executive
Council, may bring the issue, including relevant information and conclusions, to the
attention of the United Nations.
ARTICLE VI.
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
1. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of
this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty
and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties, or between one or
more States Parties and the Organization, relating to the application or interpretation
of this Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with a view to the
expeditious settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of
the parties’ choice, including recourse to appropriate organs of this Treaty and, by
mutual consent, referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the
Statute of the Court. The parties involved shall keep the Executive Council informed
24 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
of actions being taken.
3. The Executive Council may contribute to the settlement of a dispute that
may arise concerning the application or interpretation of this Treaty by whatever
means it deems appropriate, including offering its good offices, calling upon the
States Parties to a dispute to seek a settlement through a process of their own choice,
bringing the matter to the attention of the Conference and recommending a time-
limit for any agreed procedure.
4. The Conference shall consider questions related to disputes raised by States
Parties or brought to its attention by the Executive Council. The Conference shall, as
it finds necessary, establish or entrust organs with tasks related to the settlement of
these disputes in conformity with Article II, paragraph 26 (j).
5. The Conference and the Executive Council are separately empowered,
subject to authorization from the General Assembly of the United Nations, to request
the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question
arising within the scope of the activities of the Organization. An agreement between
the Organization and the United Nations shall be concluded for this purpose in
accordance with Article II, paragraph 38 (h).
6. This Article is without prejudice to Articles IV and V.
ARTICLE VII.
AMENDMENTS
1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any State Party may
propose amendments to this Treaty, the Protocol, or the Annexes to the Protocol.
Any State Party may also propose changes, in accordance with paragraph 7, to the
Protocol or the Annexes thereto. Proposals for amendments shall be subject to the
procedures in paragraphs 2 to 6. Proposals for changes, in accordance with
paragraph 7, shall be subject to the procedures in paragraph 8.
2. The proposed amendment shall be considered and adopted only by an
Amendment Conference.
3. Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Director-
General, who shall circulate it to all States Parties and the Depositary and seek the
views of the States Parties on whether an Amendment Conference should be
convened to consider the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the
Director-General no later than 30 days after its circulation that they support further
consideration of the proposal, the Director-General shall convene an Amendment
Conference to which all States Parties shall be invited.
4. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a regular
session of the Conference unless all States Parties that support the convening of an
Amendment Conference request that it be held earlier. In no case shall an
Amendment Conference be held less than 60 days after the circulation.of the
proposed amendment.
5. Amendments shall be adopted by the Amendment Conference by a positive
vote of a majority of the States Parties with no State Party casting a negative vote.
6. Amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties 30 days after deposit
of the instruments of ratification or acceptance by all those States Parties casting a
positive vote at the Amendment Conference.
7. In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, Parts I and
III of the Protocol and Annexes 1 and 2 to the Protocol shall be subject to changes in
accordance with paragraph 8, if the proposed changes are related only to matters of
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 25
an administrative or technical nature. All other provisions of the Protocol and the
Annexes thereto shall not be subject to changes in accordance with paragraph 8.
8. Proposed changes referred to in paragraph 7 shall be made in accordance
with the following procedures:
(a) The text of the proposed changes shall be transmitted together with the
necessary information to the Director-General. Additional information
for the evaluation of the proposal may be provided by any State Party
and the Director-General. The Director-General shall promptly
communicate any such proposals and information to all States Parties,
the Executive Council and the Depositary;
(b) No later than 60 days after its receipt, the Director-General shall
evaluate the proposal to determine all its possible consequences for the
provisions of this Treaty and its implementation and shall communicate
any such information to all States Parties and the Executive Council;
(c) The Executive Council shall examine the proposal in the light of all
information available to it, including whether the proposal fulfils the
requirements of paragraph 7. No later than 90 days after its receipt, the
Executive Council shall notify its recommendation, with appropriate
explanations, to all States Parties for consideration. States Parties shall
acknowledge receipt within 10 days;
(d) If the Executive Council recommends to all States Parties that the
proposal be adopted, it shall be considered approved if no State Party
objects to it within 90 days after receipt of the recommendation. If the
Executive Council recommends that the proposal be rejected, it shall be
considered rejected if no State Party objects to the rejection within 90
days after receipt of the recommendation;
(e) If a recommendation of the Executive Council does not meet with the
acceptance required under sub-paragraph (d), a decision on the
proposal, including whether it fulfils the requirements of paragraph 7,
shall be taken as a matter of substance by the Conference at its next
session;
(f) The Director-General shall notify all States Parties and the Depositary
of any decision under this paragraph;
(g) Changes approved under this procedure shall enter into force for all
States Parties 180 days after the date of notification by the Director-
General of their approval unless another time period is recommended by
the Executive Council or decided by the Conference.
ARTICLE VIII.
REVIEW OF THE TREATY
1. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after
the entry into force of this Treaty a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to
review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself
that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are
being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and
technological developments relevant to this Treaty. On the basis of a request by any
State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting the
conduct of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. If the Review
Conference decides by consensus that such nuclear explosions may be permitted, it
shall commence work without delay, with a view to recommending to States Parties
an appropriate amendment to this Treaty that shall preclude any military benefits of
26 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
such nuclear explosions. Any such proposed amendment shall be communicated to
the Director-General by any State Party and shall be dealt with in accordance with
the provisions of Article VII.
2. At intervals of ten years thereafter, further Review Conferences may be
convened with the same objective, if the Conference so decides as a matter of
procedure in the preceding year. Such Conferences may be convened after an
interval of less than ten years if so decided by the Conference as a matter of
substance.
3. Normally, any Review Conference shall be held immediately following the
regular annual session of the Conference provided for in Article II.
ARTICLE IX.
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right
to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
3. Withdrawal shall be effected by giving notice six months in advance to all
other States Parties, the Executive Council, the Depositary and the United Nations
Security Council. Notice of withdrawal shall include a statement of the extraordinary
event or events which a State Party regards as jeopardizing its supreme interests.
ARTICLE X.
STATUS OF THE PROTOCOL AND THE ANNEXES
The Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol, and the Annexes to the Protocol
form an integral part of the Treaty. Any reference to this Treaty includes the
Annexes to this Treaty, the Protocol and the Annexes to the Protocol.
ARTICLE XI.
SIGNATURE
This Treaty shall be open to a11 States for signature before its entry into
force.
ARTICLE XII.
RATIFICATION
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by States Signatories according to
their respective constitutional processes.
ARTICLE XIII.
ACCESSION
Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force may
accede to it at any time thereafter.
ARTICLE XIV.
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. This Treaty shall enter into force 180 days after the date of deposit of the
instruments of ratification by all States listed in Annex 2 to this Treaty, but in no
case earlier than two years after its opening for signature.
2. If this Treaty has not entered into force three years after the date of the
anniversary of its opening for signature, the Depositary shall convene a Conference
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 27
of the States that have already deposited their instruments of ratification upon the
request of a majority of those States. That Conference shall examine the extent to
which the requirement set out in paragraph 1 has been met and shall consider and
decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be
undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry
into force of this Treaty.
3. Unless otherwise decided by the Conference referred to in paragraph 2 or
other such conferences, this process shall be repeated at subsequent anniversaries of
the opening for signature of this Treaty, until its entry into force.
4. All States Signatories shall be invited to attend the Conference referred to in
paragraph 2 and any subsequent conferences as referred to in paragraph 3, as
observers. 5. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited
subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the 30th
day following the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
ARTICLE XV.
RESERVATIONS
The Articles of and the Annexes to this Treaty shall not be subject to
reservations. The provisions of the Protocol to this Treaty and the Annexes to the
Protocol shall not be subject to reservations incompatible with the object and
purpose of this Treaty.
ARTICLE XVI.
DEPOSITARY
1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this
Treaty and shall receive signatures, instruments of ratification and instruments of
accession.
2. The Depositary shall promptly inform all States Signatories and acceding
States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of
ratification or accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty and of any
amendments and changes thereto, and the receipt of other notices.
3. The Depositary shall send duly certified copies of this Treaty to the
Governments of the States Signatories and acceding States.
4. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of
the Charter of the United Nations.
ARTICLE XVII.
AUTHENTIC TEXTS
This Treaty, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
ANNEX 1 TO THE TREATY
LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 28
Africa
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti,
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar,
28 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger,
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia Zimbabwe.
Eastern Europe
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria,
Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Middle East and South Asia
Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Iran (Islamic Republic oþ, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Maldives, Nepal, Oman,
Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Yemen.
North America and Western Europe
Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Holy See, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of
America.
North East Asia, the Pacific and the Far East
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of,
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea,
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand,
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam.
ANNEX 2 TO THE TREATY
LIST OF STATES PURSUANT TO ARTICLE XIV
List of States members of the Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996
which formally participated in the work of the 1996 session of the Conference and
which appear in Table 1 of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Apri1 1996
edition of "Nuclear Power Reactors in the World", and of States members of the
Conference on Disarmament as at 18 June 1996 which formally participated in the
work of the 1996 session of the Conference and which appear in Table 1 of the
International Atomic Energy Agency's December 1995 edition of "Nuclear Research
Reactors in the World":
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of),
Israel, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania,
Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 29
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam, Zaire.
PROTOCOL TO THE COMPREHENSIVE
NUCLEAR TEST-BAN TREATY
PART I.
THE INTERNATIONAL MONITORING SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL 
DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The International Monitoring System shall comprise monitoring facilities as
set out in Article IV, paragraph 16, and respective means of communication.
2. The monitoring facilities incorporated into the International Monitoring
System shall consist of those facilities specified in Annex 1 to this Protocol. The
Internationa1 Monitoring System shall fulfil the technical and operational
requirements specified in the relevant operational manuals.
3. The Organization, in accordance with Article II, shall, in cooperation and
consultation with the States Parties, with other States, and with international
organizations as appropriate, establish and coordinate the operation and
maintenance, and any future agreed modification or development of the
Internationa1 Monitoring System.
4. In accordance with appropriate agreements or arrangements and procedures,
a State Party or other State hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for
International Monitoring System facilities and the Technical Secretariat shall agree
and cooperate in establishing, operating, upgrading, financing, and maintaining
monitoring facilities, related certified laboratories and respective means of
communication within areas under its jurisdiction or control or elsewhere in
conformity with international law. Such cooperation shall be in accordance with the
security and authentication requirements and technical specifications contained in
the relevant operational manuals. Such a State shall give the Technical Secretariat
authority to access a monitoring facility for checking equipment and communication
links, and shall agree to make the necessary changes in the equipment and the
operational procedures to meet agreed requirements. The Technical Secretariat shall
provide to such States appropriate technical assistance as is deemed by the Executive
Council to be required for the proper functioning of the facility as part of the
Internationa1 Monitoring System.
5. Modalities for such cooperation between the Organization and States Parties
or States hosting or otherwise taking responsibility for facilities of the Internationa1
Monitoring System shall be set out in agreements or arrangements as appropriate in
each case.
B. SEISMOLOGICAL MONITORING
6. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of
seismological data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This
cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of
primary and auxiliary seismological monitoring stations. These stations shall
provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.
7. The network of primary stations shall consist of the 50 stations specified in
Table 1-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol. These stations shall fulfil the technical and
operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological
Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Uninterrupted
30 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
data from the primary stations shall be transmitted, directly or through a national
data centre, on-line to the International Data Centre.
8. To supplement the primary network, an auxiliary network of 120 stations
shall provide information, directly or through a national data centre, to the
International Data Centre upon request. The auxiliary stations to be used are listed in
Table 1-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol. The auxiliary stations shall fulfil the technical
and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Seismological
Monitoring and the International Exchange of Seismological Data. Data from the
auxiliary stations may at any time be requested by the International Data Centre and
shall be immediately available through on-line computer connections.
C. RADIONUCLIDE MONITORING
9. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of
data on radionuclides in the atmosphere to assist in the verification of compliance
with this Treaty. This cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a
global network of radionuclide monitoring stations and certified laboratories. The
network shall provide data in accordance with agreed procedures to the International
Data Centre.
10. The network of stations to measure radionuclides in the atmosphere shall
comprise an overall network of 80 stations, as specified in Table 2-A of Annex 1 to
this Protocol. All stations shall be capable of monitoring for the presence of relevant
particulate matter in the atmosphere. Forty of these stations shall also be capable of
monitoring for the presence of relevant noble gases upon the entry into force of this
Treaty. For this purpose the Conference, at its initial session, shall approve a
recommendation by the Preparatory Commission as to which 40 stations from Table
2-A of Annex 1 to this Protocol shall be capable of noble gas monitoring. At its first
regular annual session, the Conference shall consider and decide on a plan for
implementing noble gas monitoring capability throughout the network. The
Director-General shall prepare a report to the Conference on the modalities for such
implementation. All monitoring stations shall fulfil the technical and operational
requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Radionuclide Monitoring and
the Internationa1 Exchange of Radionuc1ide Data.
11. The network of radionuclide monitoring stations shall be supported by
laboratories, which shall be certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with
the relevant operational manual for the performance, on contract to the Organization
and on a fee-for-service basis, of the analysis of samples from radionuclide
monitoring stations. Laboratories specified in Table 2-B of Annex 1 to this Protocol,
and appropriately equipped, shall, as required, also be drawn upon by the Technical
Secretariat to perform additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring
stations. With the agreement of the Executive Council, further laboratories may be
certified by the Technical Secretariat to perform the routine analysis of samples from
manual monitoring stations where necessary. All certified laboratories shall provide
the results of such analysis to the International Data Centre, and in so doing shall
fulfil the technical and operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual
on Radionuclide Monitoring and the International Exchange of Radionuclide Data.
D. HYDROACOUSTIC MONTTORING
12. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of
hydroacoustic data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This
cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of
hydroacoustic monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance
with agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.
13. The network of hydroacoustic stations shall consist of the stations specified
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 31
in Table 3 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of six
hydrophone and five T-phase stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and
operational requirements specified in the Operational Manual for Hydroacoustic
Monitoring and the International Exchange of Hydroacoustic Data.
E. INFRASOUND MONITORING
14. Each State Party undertakes to cooperate in an international exchange of
infrasound data to assist in the verification of compliance with this Treaty. This
cooperation shall include the establishment and operation of a global network of
infrasound monitoring stations. These stations shall provide data in accordance with
agreed procedures to the International Data Centre.
15. The network of infrasound stations shall consist of the stations specified in
Table 4 of Annex 1 to this Protocol, and shall comprise an overall network of 60
stations. These stations shall fulfil the technical and operational requirements
specified in the Operational Manual for Infrasound Monitoring and the International
Exchange of Infrasound Data.
F. INTERNATIONAL DATA CENTRE FUNCTIONS
16. The Internationa1 Data Centre shall receive, collect, process, analyse, report
on and archive data from International Monitoring System facilities, including the
results of analysis conducted at certified laboratories.
17. The procedures and standard event screening criteria to be used by the
International Data Centre in carrying out its agreed functions, in particular for the
production of standard reporting products and for the performance of a standard
range of services for States Parties, shall be elaborated in the Operational Manual for
the International Data Centre and shall be progressively developed. The procedures
and criteria developed initially by the Preparatory Commission shall be approved by
the Conference at its initial session.
International Data Centre standard products
18. The International Data Centre shall apply on a routine basis automatic
processing methods and interactive human analysis to raw International Monitoring
System data in order to produce and archive standard Internationa1 Data Centre
products on behalf of all States Parties. These products shall be provided at no cost
to States Parties and shall be without prejudice to final judgements with regard to the
nature of any event, which shall remain the responsibility of States Parties, and shall
include:
(a) Integrated lists of all signals detected by the International Monitoring
System, as well as standard event lists and bulletins, including the
values and associated uncertainties calculated for each event located by
the International Data Centre, based on a set of standard parameters;
(b) Standard screened event bulletins that result from the application to
each event by the International Data Centre of standard event screening
criteria, making use of the characterization parameters specified in
Annex 2 to this Protocol, with the objective of characterizing,
highlighting in the standard event bulletin, and thereby screening out,
events considered to be consistent with natural phenomena or non-
nuclear, man-made phenomena. The standard event bulletin shall
indicate numerically for each event the degree to which that event meets
or does not meet the event screening criteria. In applying standard event
screening, the International Data Centre shall use both global and
supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations
where applicable. The International Data Centre shall progressively
32 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
enhance its technical capabilities as experience is gained in the
operation of the Internationa1 Monitoring System;
(c) Executive summaries, which summarize the data acquired and archived
by the Internationa1 Data Centre, the products of the International Data
Centre, and the performance and operational status of the International
Monitoring System and International Data Centre; and
(d) Extracts or subsets of the standard Internationa1 Data Centre products
specified in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c), selected according to the request
of an individual State Party.
19. The International Data Centre shall carry out, at no cost to States Parties,
special studies to provide in-depth, technical review by expert analysis of data from
the Internationa1 Monitoring System, if requested by the Organization or by a State
Party, to improve the estimated values for the standard signal and event parameters.
International Data Centre services to States Parties
20. The International Data Centre shall provide States Parties with open, equal,
timely and convenient access to all International Monitoring System data, raw or
processed, all International Data Centre products, and all other International
Monitoring System data in the archive of the Internationa1 Data Centre or, through
the International Data Centre, of International Monitoring System facilities. The
methods for supporting data access and the provision of data shall include the
following services:
(a) Automatic and regular forwarding to a State Party of the products of the
International Data Centre or the selection by the State Party thereof,
and, as requested, the selection by the State Party of International
Monitoring System data;
(b) The provision of the data or products generated in response to ad hoc
requests by States Parties for the retrieval from the International Data
Centre and International Monitoring System facility archives of data
and products, including interactive electronic access to the International
Data Centre database; and
(c) Assisting individual States Parties, at their request and at no cost for
reasonable efforts, with expert technical analysis of International
Monitoring System data and other relevant data provided by the
requesting State Party, in order to help the State Party concerned to
identify the source of specific events. The output of any such technical
analysis shall be considered a product of the requesting State Party, but
shall be available to all States Parties.
The International Data Centre services specified in sub-paragraphs (a) and
(b) shall be made available at no cost to each State Party. The volumes and formats
of data shall be set out in the Operational Manual for the International Data Centre.
National event screening
21. The International Data Centre shall, if requested by a State Party, apply to
any of its standard products, on a regular and automatic basis, national event
screening criteria established by that State Party, and provide the results of such
analysis to that State Party. This service shall be undertaken at no cost to the
requesting State Party. The output of such national event screening processes shall
be considered a product of the requesting State Party.
Technical assistance
22. The International Data Centre shall, where required, provide technical
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 33
assistance to individual States Parties:
(a) In formulating their requirements for selection and screening of data
and products;
(b) By installing at the International Data Centre, at no cost to a requesting
State Party for reasonable efforts, computer algorithms or software
provided by that State Party to compute new signal and event
parameters that are not included in the Operational Manual for the
International Data Centre, the output being considered products of the
requesting State Party; and
(c) By assisting States Parties to develop the capability to receive, process
and analyse International Monitoring System data at a national data
centre.
23. The International Data Centre shall continuously monitor and report on the
operational status of the International Monitoring System facilities, of
communications links, and of its own processing systems. It shall provide immediate
notification to those responsible should the operational performance of any
component fail to meet agreed levels set out in the relevant operational manual.
PART II
ON-SITE INSPECTIONS
A. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The procedures in this Part shall be implemented pursuant to the provisions
for on-site inspections set out in Article IV.
2. The on-site inspection shall be carried out in the area where the event that
triggered the on-site inspection request occurred.
3. The area of an on-site inspection shall be continuous and its size shall not
exceed 1,000 square kilometres. There shall be no linear distance greater than 50
kilometres in any direction.
4. The duration of an on-site inspection shall not exceed 60 days from the date
of the approval of the on-site inspection request in accordance with Article IV,
paragraph 46, but may be extended by a maximum of 70 days in accordance with
Article IV, paragraph 49.
5. If the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate extends to the
territory or other place under the jurisdiction or control of more than one State Party,
the provisions on on-site inspections shall, as appropriate, apply to each of the States
Parties to which the inspection area extends.
6. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the
inspected State Party but is located on the territory of another State Party or where
the access from the point of entry to the inspection area requires transit through the
territory of a State Party other than the inspected State Party, the inspected State
Party shall exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations concerning such inspections
in accordance with this Protocol. In such a case, the State Party on whose territory
the inspection area is located shall facilitate the inspection and shall provide for the
necessary support to enable the inspection team to carry out its tasks in a timely and
effective manner. States Parties through whose territory transit is required to reach
the inspection area shall facilitate such transit.
7. In cases where the inspection area is under the jurisdiction or control of the
inspected State Party but is located on the territory of a State not Party to this Treaty,
the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the
34 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
inspection can be carried out in accordance with this Protocol. A State Party that has
under its jurisdiction or control one or more areas on the territory of a State not Party
to this Treaty shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the State on
whose territory the inspection area is located of inspectors and inspection assistants
designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access,
it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access.
8. In cases where the inspection area is located on the territory of a State Party
but is under the jurisdiction or control of a State not Party to this Treaty, the State
Party shall take all necessary measures required of an inspected State Party and a
State Party on whose territory the inspection area is located, without prejudice to the
rules and practices of international law, to ensure that the on-site inspection can be
carried out in accordance with this Protocol. If the State Party is unable to ensure
access to the inspection area, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures
to ensure access, without prejudice to the rules and practices of international law.
9. The size of the inspection team shall be kept to the minimum necessary for
the proper fulfilment of the inspection mandate. The total number of members of the
inspection team present on the territory of the inspected State Party at any given
time, except during the conduct of drilling, shall not exceed 40 persons. No national
of the requesting State Party or the inspected State Party shall be a member of the
inspection team.
10. The Director-General shall determine the size of the inspection team and
select its members from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants, taking into
account the circumstances of a particular request.
11. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange the amenities
necessary for the inspection team, such as communication means, interpretation
services, transportation, working space, lodging, meals, and medical care.
12. The inspected State Party shall be reimbursed by the Organization, in a
reasonably short period of time after conclusion of the inspection, for all expenses,
including those mentioned in paragraphs 11 and 49, related to the stay and functional
activities of the inspection team on the territory of the inspected State Party.
13. Procedures for the implementation of on-site inspections shall be detailed in
the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.
B. STANDING ARRANGEMENTS
Designation of Inspectors and Inspection Assistants
14. An inspection team may consist of inspectors and inspection assistants. An
on-site inspection shall only be carried out by qualified inspectors specially
designated for this function. They may be assisted by specially designated inspection
assistants, such as technical and administrative personnel, aircrew and interpreters.
15. Inspectors and inspection assistants shall be nominated for designation by
the States Parties or, in the case of staff of the Technical Secretariat, by the Director-
General, on the basis of their expertise and experience relevant to the purpose and
functions of on-site inspections. The nominees shall be approved in advance by the
States Parties in accordance with paragraph 18.
16. Each State Party, no later than 30 days after the entry into force of this
Treaty for it, shall notify the Director-General of the names, dates of birth, sex,
ranks, qualifications and professional experience of the persons proposed by the
State Party for designation as inspectors and inspection assistants.
17. No later than 60 days after the entry into force of this Treaty, the Technical
Secretariat shall communicate in writing to all States Parties an initial list of the
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 35
names, nationalities, dates of birth, sex and ranks of the inspectors and inspection
assistants proposed for designation by the Director-General and the States Parties, as
well as a description of their qualifications and professional experience.
18. Each State Party shall immediately acknowledge receipt of the initial list of
inspectors and inspection assistants proposed for designation. Any inspector or
inspection assistant included in this list shall be regarded as accepted unless a State
Party, no later than 30 days after acknowledgment of receipt of the list, declares its
non-acceptance in writing. The State Party may include the reason for the objection.
In the case of non-acceptance, the proposed inspector or inspection assistant shall
not undertake or participate in on-site inspection activities on the territory or in any
other place under the jurisdiction or control of the State Party that has declared its
non-acceptance. The Technical Secretariat shall immediately confirm receipt of the
notification of objection.
19. Whenever additions or changes to the list of inspectors and inspection
assistants are proposed by the Director-General or a State Party, replacement
inspectors and inspection assistants shall be designated in the same manner as set
forth with respect to the initial list. Each State Party shall promptly notify the
Technical Secretariat if an inspector or inspection assistant nominated by it can no
longer fulfil the duties of an inspector or inspection assistant.
20. The Technical Secretariat shall keep the list of inspectors and inspection
assistants up to date and notify all States Parties of any additions or changes to the
list.
21. A State Party requesting an on-site inspection may propose that an inspector
from the list of inspectors and inspection assistants serve as its observer in
accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61.
22. Subject to paragraph 23, a State Party shall have the right at any time to
object to an inspector or inspection assistant who has already been accepted. It shall
notify the Technical Secretariat of its objection in writing and may include the
reason for the objection. Such objection shall come into effect 30 days after receipt
of the notification by the Technical Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall
immediately confirm receipt of the notification of the objection and inform the
objecting and nominating States Parties of the date on which the inspector or
inspection assistant shall cease to be designated for that State Party.
23. A State Party that has been notified of an inspection shall not seek the
removal from the inspection team of any of the inspectors or inspection assistants
named in the inspection mandate.
24. The number of inspectors and inspection assistants accepted by a State Party
must be sufficient to allow for availability of appropriate numbers of inspectors and
inspection assistants. If, in the opinion of the Director-General, the non-acceptance
by a State Party of proposed inspectors or inspection assistants impedes the
designation of a sufficient number of inspectors and inspection assistants or
otherwise hampers the effective fulfilment of the purposes of an on-site inspection,
the Director-General shall refer the issue to the Executive Council.
25. Each inspector included in the list of inspectors and inspection assistants
shall receive relevant training. Such training shall be provided by the Technical
Secretariat pursuant to the procedures specified in the Operational Manual for On-
Site Inspections. The Technical Secretariat shall to-ordinate, in agreement with the
States Parties, a schedule of training for the inspectors.
Privileges and Immunities
26. Following acceptance of the initial list of inspectors and inspection
36 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
assistants as provided for in paragraph 18 or as subsequently altered in accordance
with paragraph 19, each State Party shall be obliged to issue, in accordance with its
national procedures and upon application by an inspector or inspection assistant,
multiple entry/exit and/or transit visas and other relevant documents to enable each
inspector and inspection assistant to enter and to remain on the territory of that State
Party for the sole purpose of carrying out inspection activities. Each State Party shall
issue the necessary visa or travel documents for this purpose no later than 48 hours
after receipt of the application or immediately upon arrival of the inspection team at
the point of entry on the territory of the State Party. Such documents shall be valid
for as long as is necessary to enable the inspector or inspection assistant to remain on
the territory of the inspected State Party for the sole purpose of carrying out the
inspection activities.
27. To exercise their functions effectively, members of the inspection team shall
be accorded privileges and immunities as set forth in sub-paragraphs (a) to (l).
Privileges and immunities shall be granted to members of the inspection team for the
sake of this Treaty and not for the personal benefit of the individuals themselves.
Such privileges and immunities shall be accorded to them for the entire period
between arrival on and departure from the territory of the inspected State Party, and
thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official
functions.
(a) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the inviolability
enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961;
(b) The living quarters and office premises occupied by the inspection team
carrying out inspection activities pursuant to this Treaty shall be
accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of
diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph 1, of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
(c) The papers and correspondence, including records, of the inspection
team shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to all papers and
correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30, paragraph
2, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The inspection
team shall have the right to use codes for their communications with the
Technical Secretariat;
(d) Samples and approved equipment carried by members of the inspection
team shall be inviolable subject to provisions contained in this Treaty
and exempt from all customs duties. Hazardous samples shall be
transported in accordance with relevant regulations;
(e) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the immunities
accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 31, paragraphs 1, 2
and 3, of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
(f) The members of the inspection team carrying out prescribed activities
pursuant to this Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and
taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
(g) The members of the inspection team shall be permitted to bring into the
territory of the inspected State Party, without payment of any customs
duties or related charges, articles for personal use, with the exception of
articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled
by quarantine regulations;
(h) The members of the inspection team shall be accorded the same
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 37
currency and exchange facilities as are accorded to representatives of
foreign Governments on temporary official missions; and
(i) The members of the inspection team shall not engage in any
professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory
of the inspected State Party.
28. When transiting the territory of States Parties other than the inspected State
Party, the members of the inspection team shall be accorded the privileges and
immunities enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 1, of the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Papers and correspondence, including
records, and samples and approved equipment carried by them, shall be accorded the
privileges and immunities set forth in paragraph 27 (c) and (d).
29. Without prejudice to their privileges and immunities the members of the
inspection team shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected
State Party and, to the extent that is consistent with the inspection mandate, shall be
obliged not to interfere in the internal affairs of that State. If the inspected State
Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified
in this Protocol, consultations shall be held between the State Party and the Director-
General to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to
prevent a repetition of such an abuse.
30. The immunity from jurisdiction of members of the inspection team may be
waived by the Director-General in those cases when the Director-General is of the
opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived
without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty. Waiver
must always be express.
31. Observers shall be accorded the same privileges and immunities accorded to
members of the inspection team pursuant to this section, except for those accorded
pursuant to paragraph 27 (d).
Points of Entry
32. Each State Party shall designate its points of entry and shall supply the
required information to the Technical Secretariat no later than 30 days after this
Treaty enters into force for it. These points of entry shall be such that the inspection
team can reach any inspection area from at least one point of entry within 24 hours.
Locations of points of entry shall be provided to all States Parties by the Technical
Secretariat. Points of entry may also serve as points of exit.
33. Each State Party may change its points of entry by giving notice of such
change to the Technical Secretariat. Changes shall become effective 30 days after
the Technical Secretariat receives such notification, to allow appropriate notification
to all States Parties.
34. If the Technical Secretariat considers that there are insufficient points of
entry for the timely conduct of inspections or that changes to the points of entry
proposed by a State Party would hamper such timely conduct of inspections, it shall
enter into consultations with the State Party concerned to resolve the problem.
Arrangements for Use of Non-Scheduled Aircraft
35. Where timely travel to the point of entry is not feasible using scheduled
commercial flights, an inspection team may utilize non-scheduled aircraft. No later
than 30 days after this Treaty enters into force for it, each State Party shall inform
the Technical Secretariat of the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-
scheduled aircraft transporting an inspection team and equipment necessary for
inspection. Aircraft routings shall be along established international airways that are
38 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
agreed upon between the State Party and the Technical Secretariat as the basis for
such diplomatic clearance.
Approved Inspection Equipment
36. The Conference, at its initial session, shall consider and approve a list of
equipment for use during on-site inspections. Each State Party may submit proposals
for the inclusion of equipment in the list. Specifications for the use of the equipment,
as detailed in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections, shall take account of
safety and confidentiality considerations where such equipment is likely to be used.
37. The equipment for use during on-site inspections shall consist of core
equipment for the inspection activities and techniques specified in paragraph 69 and
auxiliary equipment necessary for the effective and timely conduct of on-site
inspections.
38. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure that all types of approved equipment
are available for on-site inspections when required. When required for an on-site
inspection, the Technical Secretariat shall duly certify that the equipment has been
calibrated, maintained and protected. To facilitate the checking of the equipment at
the point of entry by the inspected State Party, the Technical Secretariat shall
provide documentation and attach seals to authenticate the certification.
39. Any permanently held equipment shall be in the custody of the Technical
Secretariat. The Technical Secretariat shall be responsible for the maintenance and
calibration of such equipment.
40. As appropriate, the Technical Secretariat shall make arrangements with
States Parties to provide equipment mentioned in the list. Such States Parties shall be
responsible for the maintenance and calibration of such equipment.
C. ON-SITE INSPECTION REQUEST, INSPECTION MANDATE
AND NOTIFICATION OF INSPECTION
On-Site Inspection Request
41. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 37, the on-site inspection request shall
contain at least the following information:
(a) The estimated geographical and vertical coordinates of the location of
the event that triggered the request with an indication of the possible
margin of error;
(b) The proposed boundaries of the area to be inspected, specified on a map
and in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3;
(c) The State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an indication that the
area to be inspected or part thereof is beyond the jurisdiction or control
of any State;
(d) The probable environment of the event that triggered the request;
(e) The estimated time of the event that triggered the request with
indication of the possible margin of error;
(f) All data upon which the request is based;
(g) The personal details of the proposed observer, if any; and
(h) The results of a consultation and clarification process in accordance
with Article IV, or an explanation, if relevant, of the reasons why such a
consultation and clarification process has not been earned out.
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 39
Inspection Mandate
42. The mandate for an on-site inspection shall contain:
(a) The decision of the Executive Council on the on-site inspection request;
(b) The name of the State Party or States Parties to be inspected or an
indication that the inspection area or part thereof is beyond the
jurisdiction or control of any State;
(c) The location and boundaries of the inspection area specified on a map,
taking into account all information on which the request was based and
all other available technical information, in consultation with the
requesting State Party;
(d) The planned types of activity of the inspection team in the inspection
area;
(e) The point of entry to be used by the inspection team;
(f) Any transit or basing points, as appropriate;
(g) The name of the head of the inspection team;
(h) The names of members of the inspection team;
(i) The name of the proposed observer, if any; and
(j) The list of equipment to be used in the inspection area.
If a decision by the Executive Council pursuant to Article IV, paragraphs 46
to 49, necessitates a modification of the inspection mandate, the Director-General
may update the mandate with respect to sub-paragraphs (d), (h) and (j), as
appropriate. The Director-General shall immediately notify the inspected State Party
of any such modification.
Notification of Inspection
43. The notification made by the Director-General pursuant to Article IV,
paragraph 55 shall include the following information:
(a) The inspection mandate;
(b) The date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the
point of entry;
(c) The means of arrival at the point of entry;
(d) If appropriate, the standing diplomatic clearance number for non-
scheduled aircraft; and
(e) A list of any equipment which the Director-General requests the
inspected State Party to make available to the inspection team for use in
the inspection area.
44. The inspected State Party shall acknowledge receipt of the notification by
the Director-General no later than 12 hours after having received the notification.
D. PRE-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
Entry into the Territory of the Inspected State Party, Activities at the Point of Entry 
and Transfer to the Inspection Area
45. The inspected State Party that has been notified of the arrival of the
inspection team shall ensure the immediate entry of the inspection team into its
territory.
46. When a non-scheduled aircraft is used for travel to the point of entry, the
40 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
Technical Secretariat shall provide the inspected State Party with a flight plan,
through the National Authority, for the flight of the aircraft from the last airfield
prior to entering the airspace of that State Party to the point of entry, no less than six
hours before the scheduled departure time from that airfield. Such a plan shall be
filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation
Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The Technical Secretariat shall include in
the remarks section of the flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and
the appropriate notation identifying the aircraft as an inspection aircraft. If a military
aircraft is used, the Technical Secretariat shall request prior authorization from the
inspected State Party to enter its airspace.
47. No less than three hours before the scheduled departure of the inspection
team from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected State Party,
the inspected State Party shall ensure that the flight plan filed in accordance with
paragraph 46 is approved, so that the inspection team may arrive at the point of entry
by the estimated arrival time.
48. Where necessary, the head of the inspection team and the representative of
the inspected State Party shall agree on a basing point and a flight plan from the
point of entry to the basing point and, if necessary, to the inspection area.
49. The inspected State Party shall provide for or arrange parking, security
protection, servicing and fuel as required by the Technical Secretariat for the aircraft
of the inspection team at the point of entry and, where necessary, at the basing point
and at the inspection area. Such aircraft shall not be liable for landing fees, departure
tax, and similar charges. This paragraph shall also apply to aircraft used for
overflight during the on-site inspection.
50. Subject to paragraph 51, there shall be no restriction by the inspected State
Party on the inspection team bringing approved equipment that is in conformity with
the inspection mandate into the territory of that State Party, or on its use in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.
51. The inspected State Party shall have the right, without prejudice to the time-
frame specified in paragraph 54, to check in the presence of inspection team
members at the point of entry that the equipment has been approved and certified in
accordance with paragraph 38. The inspected State Party may exclude equipment
that is not in conformity with the inspection mandate or that has not been approved
and certified in accordance with paragraph 38.
52. Immediately upon arrival at the point of entry and without prejudice to the
time-frame specified in paragraph 54, the head of the inspection team shall present
to the representative of the inspected State Party the inspection mandate and an
initial inspection plan prepared by the inspection team specifying the activities to be
carried out by it. The inspection team shall be briefed by representatives of the
inspected State Party with aid of maps and other documentation as appropriate. The
briefing shall include relevant natural terrain features, safety and confidentiality
issues, and logistical arrangements for the inspection. The inspected State Party may
indicate locations within the inspection area that, in its view, are not related to the
purpose of the inspection.
53. After the pre-inspection briefing, the inspection team shall, as appropriate,
modify the initial inspection plan, taking into account any comments by the
inspected State Party. The modified inspection plan shall be made available to the
representative of the inspected State Party.
54. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide
assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, the approved
equipment specified in paragraphs 50 and 51 and baggage from the point of entry to
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 41
the inspection area no later than 36 hours after arrival at the point of entry, if no
other timing has been agreed upon within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.
55. To confirm that the area to which the inspection team has been transported
corresponds to the inspection area specified in the inspection mandate, the
inspection team shall have the right to use approved location-finding equipment. The
inspected State Party shall assist the inspection team in this task.
E. CONDUCT OF INSPECTIONS
General Rules
56. The inspection team shall discharge its functions in accordance with the
provisions for the Treaty and this Protocol.
57. The inspection team shall begin its inspection activities in the inspection
area as soon as possible, but in no case later than 72 hours after arrival at the point of
entry.
58. The activities of the inspection team shall be so arranged as to ensure the
timely and effective discharge of its functions and the least possible inconvenience
to the inspected State Party and disturbance to the inspection area.
59. In cases where the inspected State Party has been requested, pursuant to
paragraph 43 (e) or in the course of the inspection, to make available any equipment
for use by the inspection team in the inspection area, the inspected State Party shall
comply with the request to the extent it can.
60. During the on-site inspection the inspection team shall have,  inter alia :
(a) The right to determine how the inspection will proceed, consistent with
the inspection mandate and taking into account any steps taken by the
inspected State Party consistent with the provisions on managed access;
(b) The right to modify the inspection plan, as necessary, to ensure the
effective execution of the inspection;
(c) The obligation to take into account the recommendations and suggested
modifications by the inspected State Party to the inspection plan;
(d) The right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that
may arise during the inspection;
(e) The obligation to use only those techniques specified in paragraph 69
and to refrain from activities that are not relevant to the purpose of the
inspection. The team shall collect and document such facts as are
related to the purpose of the inspection, but shall neither seek nor
document information that is clearly unrelated thereto. Any material
collected and subsequently found not to be relevant shall be returned to
the inspected State Party;
(f) The obligation to take into account and include in its report date and
explanations on the nature of the event that triggered the request,
provided by the inspected State Party from the national monitoring
networks of the inspected State Party and from other sources;
(g) The obligation to provide the inspected State Party, at its request, with
copies of the information and data collected in the inspection area; and
(h) The obligation to respect the confidentiality and the safety and health
regulations of the inspected State Party.
61. During the on-site inspection the inspected State Party shall have,  inter alia :
(a) The right to make recommendations at any time to the inspection team
42 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
regarding possible modification of the inspection plan;
(b) The right and the obligation to provide a representative to liaise with the
inspection team;
(c) The right to have representatives accompany the inspection team during
the performance of its duties and observe all inspection activities
carried out by the inspection team. This shall not delay or otherwise
hinder the inspection team in the exercise of its functions;
(d) The right to provide additional information and to request the collection
and documentation of additional facts it believes are relevant to the
inspection;
(e) The right to examine all photographic and measurement products as
well as samples and to retain any photographs or parts thereof showing
sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. The inspected
State Party shall have the right to receive duplicate copies of all
photographic and measurement products. The inspected State Party
shall have the right to retain photographic originals and first-generation
photographic products and to put photographs or parts thereof
underjoint seal within its territory. The inspected State Party shall have
the right to provide its own camera operator to take still/video
photographs as requested by the inspection team. Otherwise, these
functions shall be performed by members of the inspection team;
(f) The right to provide the inspection team, from its national monitoring
networks and from other sources, with data and explanations on the
nature of the event that triggered the request; and
(g) The obligation to provide the inspection team with such clarification as
may be necessary to resolve any ambiguities that arise during the
inspection.
Communications
62. The members of the inspection team shall have the right at all times during
the on-site inspection to communicate with each other and with the Technical
Secretariat. For this purpose they may use their own duly approved and certified
equipment with the consent of the inspected State Party to the extent that the
inspected State Party does not provide them with access to other
telecommunications.
Observer
63. In accordance with Article IV, paragraph 61, the requesting State Party shall
liaise with the Technical Secretariat to co-ordinate the arrival of the observer at the
same point of entry or basing point as the inspection team within a reasonable period
of the arrival of the inspection team.
64. The observer shall have the right throughout the inspection to be in
communication with the embassy of the requesting State Party located in the
inspected State Party or, in the case of absence of an embassy, with the requesting
State Party itself.
65. The observer shall have the right to arrive at the inspection area and to have
access to and within the inspection area as granted by the inspected State Party.
66. The observer shall have the right to make recommendations to the inspection
team throughout the inspection.
67. Throughout the inspection, the inspection team shall keep the observer
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 43
informed about the conduct of the inspection and the findings.
68. Throughout the inspection, the inspected State Party shall provide or arrange
for the amenities necessary for the observer similar to those enjoyed by the
inspection team as described in paragraph 11. All costs in connection with the stay
of the observer on the territory of the inspected State Party shall be borne by the
requesting State Party.
Inspection Activities and Techniques
69. The following inspection activities may be conducted and techniques used,
in accordance with the provisions on managed access, on collection, handling and
analysis of samples, and on overflights:
(a) Position finding from the air and at the surface to confirm the
boundaries of the inspection area and establish coordinates of locations
therein, in support of the inspection activities;
(b) Visual observation, video and still photography and multi-spectral
imaging, including infrared measurements, at and below the surface,
and from the air, to search for anomalies or artifacts;
(c) Measurement of levels of radioactivity above, at and below the surface,
using gamma radiation monitoring and energy resolution analysis from
the air, and at or under the surface, to search for and identify radiation
anomalies;
(d) Environmental sampling and analysis of solids, liquids and gases from
above, at and below the surface to detect anomalies;
(e) Passive seismological monitoring for aftershocks to localize the search
area and facilitate determination of the nature of an event;
(f) Resonance seismometry and active seismic surveys to search for and
locate underground anomalies, including cavities and rubble zones;
(g) Magnetic and gravitational field mapping, ground penetrating radar and
electrical conductivity measurements at the surface and from the air, as
appropriate, to detect anomalies or artifacts; and
(h) Drilling to obtain radioactive samples.
70. Up to 25 days after the approval of the on-site inspection in accordance with
Article IV, paragraph 46, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of
the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (e).
Following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in accordance with
Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team shall have the right to conduct any of
the activities and use any of the techniques listed in paragraph 69 (a) to (g). The
inspection team shall only conduct drilling after the approval of the Executive
Council in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 48. If the inspection team requests
an extension of the inspection duration in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 49,
it shall indicate in its request which of the activities and techniques listed in
paragraph 69 it intends to carry out in order to be able to fulfil its mandate.
Overflights
71. The inspection team shall have the right to conduct an overflight over the
inspection area during the on-site inspection for the purposes of providing the
inspection team with a general orientation of the inspection area, narrowing down
and optimizing the locations for ground-based inspection and facilitating the
collection of factual evidence, using equipment specified in paragraph 79.
72. The overflight shall be conducted as soon as practically possible. The total
44 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
duration of the overflight over the inspection area shall be no more than 12 hours.
73. Additional overflights using equipment specified in paragraphs 79 and 80
may be conducted subject to the agreement of the inspected State Party.
74. The area to be covered by overflights shall not extend beyond the inspection
area.
75. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose restrictions or, in
exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions on the overflight of
sensitive sites not related to the purpose of the inspection. Restrictions may relate to
the flight altitude, the number of passes and circling, the duration of hovering, the
type of aircraft, the number of inspectors on board, and the type of measurements or
observations. If the inspection team considers that the restrictions or prohibitions on
the overflight of sensitive sites may impede the fulfilment of its mandate, the
inspected State Party shall make every reasonable effort to provide alternative means
of inspection.
76. Overflights shall be conducted according to a flight plan duly filed and
approved in accordance with aviation rules and regulations of the inspected State
Party. Flight safety regulations of the inspected State Party shall be strictly observed
throughout all flying operations.
77. During overflights landing should normally be authorized only for purposes
of staging or refuelling.
78. Overflights shall be conducted at altitudes as requested by the inspection
team consistent with the activities to be conducted, visibility conditions, as well as
the aviation and the safety regulations of the inspected State Party and its right to
protect sensitive information not related to the purposes of the inspection.
Overflights shall be conducted up to a maximum altitude of 1,500 metres above the
surface.
79. For the overflight conducted pursuant to paragraphs 71 and 72, the
following equipment may be used on board the aircraft:
(a) Field glasses;
(b) Passive location-finding equipment;
(c) Video cameras; and
(d) Hand-held still cameras.
80. For any additional overflights conducted pursuant to paragraph 73,
inspectors on board the aircraft may also use portable, easily installed equipment for:
(a) Multi-spectral (including infrared) imagery;
(b) Gamma spectroscopy; and
(c) Magnetic field mapping.
81. Overflights shall be conducted with a relatively slow fixed or rotary wing
aircraft. The aircraft shall afford a broad, unobstructed view of the surface below.
82. The inspected State Party shall have the right to provide its own aircraft,
pre-equipped as appropriate in accordance with the technical requirements of the
relevant operational manual, and crew. Otherwise, the aircraft shall be provided or
rented by the Technical Secretariat.
83. If the aircraft is provided or rented by the Technical Secretariat, the
inspected State Party shall have the right to check the aircraft to ensure that it is
equipped with approved inspection equipment. Such checking shall be completed
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 45
within the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.
84. Personnel on board the aircraft shall consist of:
(a) The minimum number of flight crew consistent with the safe operation
of the aircraft;
(b) Up to four members of the inspection team;
(c) Up to two representatives of the inspected State Party;
(d) An observer, if any, subject to the agreement of the inspected State
Party; and
(e) An interpreter, if necessary.
85. Procedures for the implementation of overflights shall be detailed in the
Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.
Managed Access
86. The inspection team shall have the right to access the inspection area in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and this Protocol.
87. The inspected State Party shall provide access within the inspection area in
accordance with the time-frame specified in paragraph 57.
88. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 and paragraph 86 above, the rights and
obligations of the inspected State Party shall include:
(a) The right to take measures to protect sensitive installations and
locations in accordance with this Protocol;
(b) The obligation, when access is restricted within the inspection area, to
make every reasonable effort to satisfy the requirements of the
inspection mandate through alternative means. Resolving any questions
regarding one or more aspects of the inspection shall not delay or
interfere with the conduct of the inspection team of other aspects of the
inspection; and
(c) The right to make the final decision regarding any access of the
inspection team, taking into account its obligations under this Treaty
and the provisions on managed access.
89. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 57 (b) and paragraph 88 (a) above, the
inspected State Party shall have the right throughout the inspection area to take
measures to protect sensitive installations and locations and to prevent disclosure of
confidential information not related to the purpose of the inspection. Such measures
may include,  inter alia :
(a) Shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment;
(b) Restricting measurements of radionuclide activity and nuclear radiation
to determining the presence or absence of those types and energies of
radiation relevant to the purpose of the inspection;
(c) Restricting the taking of or analysing of samples to determining the
presence or absence of radioactive or other products relevant to the
purpose of the inspection;
(d) Managing access to buildings and other structures in accordance with
paragraphs 90 and 91; and
(e) Declaring restricted-access sites in accordance with paragraphs 92 to
96.
90. Access to buildings and other structures shall be deferred until after the
46 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
approval of the continuation of the on-site inspection in accordance with Article IV,
paragraph 47, except for access to buildings and other structures housing the
entrance to a mine, other excavations, or caverns of large volume not otherwise
accessible. For such buildings and structures, the inspection team shall have the right
only of transit, as directed by the inspected State Party, in order to enter such mines,
caverns or other excavations.
91. If, following the approval of the continuation of the inspection in
accordance with Article IV, paragraph 47, the inspection team demonstrates credibly
to the inspected State Party that access to buildings and other structures is necessary
to fulfil the inspection mandate and that the necessary activities authorized in the
mandate could not be carried out from the outside, the inspection team shall have the
right to gain access to such buildings or other structures. The head of the inspection
team shall request access to a specific building or structure indicating the purpose of
such access, the specific number of inspectors, as well as the intended activities. The
modalities for access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection team and
the inspected State Party. The inspected State Party shall have the right to impose
restrictions or, in exceptional cases and with reasonable justification, prohibitions,
on the access to buildings and other structures.
92. When restricted-access sites are declared pursuant to paragraph 89 (e), each
such site shall be no larger than 4 square kilometres. The inspected State Party has
the right to declare up to 50 square kilometres of restricted-access sites. If more than
one restricted-access site is declared, each such site shall be separated from any
other such site by a minimum distance of 20 metres. Each restricted-access site shall
have clearly defined and accessible boundaries.
93. The size, location, and boundaries of restricted-access sites shall be
presented to the head of the inspection team no later than the time that the inspection
team seeks access to a location that contains all or part of such a site.
94. The inspection team shall have the right to place equipment and take other
steps necessary to conduct its inspection up to the boundary of a restricted-access
site.
95. The inspection team shall be permitted to observe visually all open places
within the restricted-access site from the boundary of the site.
96. The inspection team shall make every reasonable effort to fulfil the
inspection mandate outside the declared restricted-access sites prior to requesting
access to such sites. If at any time the inspection team demonstrates credibly to the
inspected State Party that the necessary activities authorized in the mandate could
not be carried out from the outside and that access to a restricted-access site is
necessary to fulfil the mandate, some members of the inspection team shall be
granted access to accomplish specific tasks within the site. The inspected State Party
shall have the right to shroud or otherwise protect sensitive equipment, objects and
materials not related to the purpose of the inspection. The number of inspectors shall
be kept to the minimum necessary to complete the tasks related to the inspection.
The modalities for such access shall be subject to negotiation between the inspection
team and the inspected State Party.
Collection, Handling and Analysis of Samples
97. Subject to paragraphs 86 to 96 and 98 to 100, the inspection team shall have
the right to collect and remove relevant samples from the inspection area.
98. Whenever possible, the inspection team shall analyse samples on-site.
Representatives of the inspected State Party shall have the right to be present when
samples are analysed on-site. At the request of the inspection team, the inspected
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 47
State Party shall, in accordance with agreed procedures, provide assistance for the
analysis of samples on-site. The inspection team shall have the right to transfer
samples for off site analysis at laboratories designated by the Organization only if it
demonstrates that the necessary sample analysis cannot be performed on-site.
99. The inspected State Party shall have the right to retain portions of all
samples collected when these samples are analysed and may take duplicate samples.
100. The inspected State Party shall have the right to request that any unused
samples or portions thereof be returned.
101. The designated laboratories shall conduct chemical and physical analysis of
the samples transferred for off-site analysis. Details of such analysis shall be
elaborated in the Operational Manual for On-Site Inspections.
102. The Director-General shall have the primary responsibility for the security,
integrity and preservation of samples and for ensuring that the confidentiality of
samples transferred for off site analysis is protected. The Director-General shall do
so in accordance with procedures contained in the Operational Manual for On-Site
Inspections. The Director-General shall in any case:
(a) Establish a stringent regime governing the collection, handling,
transport and analysis of samples;
(b) Certify the laboratories designated to perform different types of
analysis;
(c) Oversee the standardization of equipment and procedures at these
designated laboratories and of mobile analytical equipment and
procedures;
(d) Monitor quality control and overall standards in relation to the
certification of these laboratories and in relation to mobile equipment
and procedures; and
(e) Select from among the designated laboratories those which shall
perform analytical or other functions in relation to specific
investigations.
103. When off site analysis is to be performed, samples shall be analysed in at
least two designated laboratories. The Technical Secretariat shall ensure the
expeditious processing of the analysis. The samples shall be accounted for by the
Technical Secretariat and any unused samples or portions thereof shall be returned to
the Technical Secretariat.
104. The Technical Secretariat shall compile the results of the laboratory analysis
of samples relevant to the purpose of the inspection. Pursuant to Article IV,
paragraph 63, the Director-General shall transmit any such results promptly to the
inspected State Party for comments and thereafter to the Executive Council and to all
other States Parties and shall include detailed information concerning the equipment
and methodology employed by the designated laboratories.
105. In case of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control
of any State, the Director-General shall consult with the appropriate States Parties
and agree on any transit or basing points to facilitate a speedy arrival of the
inspection team in the inspection area.
106. The States Parties on whose territory transit or basing points are located
shall, as far as possible, assist in facilitating the inspection, including transporting
the inspection team, its baggage and equipment to the inspection area, as well as
providing the relevant amenities specified in paragraph 11. The Organization shall
reimburse assisting States Parties for all costs incurred.
48 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
107. Subject to the approval of the Executive Council, the Director-General may
negotiate standing arrangements with States Parties to facilitate assistance in the
event of an on-site inspection in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any
State.
108. In cases where one or more States Parties have conducted an investigation of
an ambiguous event in an area beyond the jurisdiction or control of any State before
a request is made for an on-site inspection in that area, any results of such
investigation may be taken into account by the Executive Council in its deliberations
pursuant to Article IV.
Post-Inspection Procedures
109. Upon conclusion of the inspection, the inspection team shall meet with the
representative of the inspected State Party to review the preliminary findings of the
inspection team and to clarify any ambiguities. The inspection team shall provide the
representative of the inspected State Party with its preliminary findings in written
form according to a standardized format, together with a list of any samples and
other material taken from the inspection area pursuant to paragraph 98. The
document shall be signed by the head of the inspection team. In order to indicate that
he or she has taken notice of the contents of the document, the representative of the
inspected State Party shall countersign the document. The meeting shall be
completed no later than 24 hours after the conclusion of the inspection.
Departure
110. Upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team and
the observer shall leave, as soon as possible, the territory of the inspected State
Party. The inspected State Party shall do everything in its power to provide
assistance and to ensure the safe conduct of the inspection team, equipment and
baggage to the point of exit. Unless agreed otherwise by the inspected State Party
and the inspection team, the point of exit used shall be the same as the point of entry.
PART III
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
1. Pursuant to Article IV, paragraph 68, each State Party shall, on a voluntary
basis, provide the Technical Secretariat with notification of any chemical explosion
using 300 tonnes or greater of TNT-equivalent blasting material detonated as a
single explosion anywhere on its territory, or at any place under its jurisdiction or
control. If possible, such notification shall be provided in advance. Such notification
shall include details on location, time, quantity and type of explosive used, as well as
on the configuration and intended purpose of the blast.
2. Each State Party shall, on a voluntary basis, as soon as possible after the entry
into force of this Treaty provide to the Technical Secretariat, and at annual intervals
thereafter update, information related to its national use of all other chemical
explosions greater than 300 tonnes TNT-equivalent. In particular, the State Party
shall seek to advise:
(a) The geographic locations of sites where the explosions originate;
(b) The nature of activities producing them and the general profile and
frequency of such explosions;
(c) Any other relevant detail, if available; and
to assist the Technical Secretariat in clarifying the origins of any such event detected
by the International Monitoring System.
3. A State Party may, on a voluntary and mutually acceptable basis, invite
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 49
representatives of the Technical Secretariat or of other States Parties to visit sites
within its territory referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2.
4. For the purpose of calibrating the International Monitoring System, States
Parties may liaise with the Technical Secretariat to carry out chemical calibration
explosions or to provide relevant information on chemical explosions planned for
other purposes.
ANNEX 1 TO THE PROTOCOL
Table 1-A List of Seismological Stations Comprising the Primary Network
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
1 Argentina PLCA
Paso Flores
40.7 S  70.6 W 3-C
2 Australia WRA
Warramunga, NT
19.9 S 134.3 E array
3 Australia ASAR
Alice Springs, NT
23.7 S 133.9 E array
4 Australia STKA
Stephens Creek, SA
31.9 S 141.6 E 3-C
5 Australia MAW
Mawson, Antarctica
67.6 S 62.9 E 3-C
6 Bolivia LPAZ
La Paz
16.3 S 68.1 W 3-C
7 Brazil BDFB
Brasilia
15.6 S 48.0 W 3-C
8 Canada ULMC
Lac du Bonnet, Man.
50.2 N 95.9 W 3-C
9 Canada YKAC
Yellowknife, N.W.T.
62.5 N 114.6 W array
10 Canada SCH
Schefferville, 
Quebec
54.8 N 66.8 W 3-C
11 Central African 
Republic
BGCA
Bangui
05.2 N 18.4 E  3-C
12 China HAI
Hailar
49.3 N 119.7 E 3-C > array
13 China LZH
Lanzhou
36.1 N 103.8 E 3-C > array
14 Colombia XSA
El Rosal
04.9 N 74.3 W 3-C
15 Cote d’Ivoire DBIC
Dimbroko
06.7 N 04.9 W 3-C
16 Egypt LXEG
Luxor
26.0 N 33.0 E array
17 Finland FINES
Lahti
61.4 N 28.1 E array
18 France PPT
Tahiti
17.6 S 149.6 W 3-C
19 Germany GEC2
Freyung
48.9 N 13.7 E array
20 To be 
determined
To be determined To be 
determined
To be 
determined
To be 
determined
50 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
21 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
THR
Tehran
35.8 N 51.4 E 3-C
22 Japan MJAR
Matsushiro
36.5 N 138.2 E array
23 Kazakstan MAK
Makanchi
46.8 N 82.0 E array
24 Kenya KMBO
Kilimambogo
01.1 S 37.2 E 3-C
25 Mongolia JAVM
Javhlant
48.0 N 106.8 E 3-C > array
26 Niger New Site to be 
determined
to be 
determined
3-C > array
27 Norway NAO
Hamar
60.8 N 10.8 E array
28 Norway ARAO
Karasjok
69.5 N 25.5 E array
29 Pakistan PRPK
Pari
33.7 N 73.3 E array
30 Paraguay CPUP
Villa Florida
26.3 S 57.3 W 3-C
31 Republic of 
Korea
KSRS
Wonju
37.5 N 127.9 E array
32 Russian 
Federation
KBZ
Khabaz
43.7 N 42.9 E 3-C
33 Russian 
Federation
ZAL
Zalesovo
53.9 N 84.8 E 3-C > array
34 Russian 
Federation
NRI
Norilsk
69.0 N 88.0 E 3-C
35 Russian 
Federation
PDY
Peleduy
59.6 N 112.6 E 3-C > array
36 Russian 
Federation
PET
Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy
53.1 N 157.8 E 3-C > array
37 Russian 
Federation 
USK
Ussuriysk
44.2 N 132.0 E 3-C > array
38 Saudi Arabia New Site to be 
determined
to be 
determined
array
39 South Africa BOSA
Boshot
28.6 S 25.6 E 3-C
40 Spain ESDC
Sonseca
39.7 N 04.0 W array
41 Thailand CMTO
Chiang Mai
18.8 N 99.0 E array
42 Tunisia THA
Thala
35.6 N 08.7 E 3-C
43 Turkey BRTR
Belbashi
The array is subject 
to relocation at 
Keskin
39.9 N 32.8 E array
44 Turkmenistan GEYT
Alibeck
37.9 N 58.1 E array
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 51
Key : 3-C > array: Indicates that the site could start operations in the International
Monitoring System as a three-component station and be upgraded to an array at a later time.
Table 1-B List of Seismological Stations Comprising the Auxiliary Network
45 Ukraine AKASG
Malin
50.4 N 29.1 E array
46 United States of 
America
LJTX
Lajitas, TX
29.3 N 103.7 W array
47 United States of 
America
MNV
Mina, NV
38.4 N 118.2 W array
48 United States of 
America
PIWY
Pinedale, WY
42.8 N 109.6 W array
49 United States of 
America
ELAK
Eielson, AK
64.8 N 146.9 W array
50 United States of 
America
VNDA
Vanda, Antarctica
77.5 S 161.9 E 3-C
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
1 Argentina CFA
Coronel Fontana
31.6 S 68.2 W 3-C
2 Argentina USHA
Ushuaia
55.0 S 68.0 W 3-C
3 Armenia GNI
Garni
40.1 N 44.7 E 3-C
4 Australia  CTA
Charters Towers, 
QLD
20.1 S 146.3 E 3-C
5 Australia FITZ
Fitzroy Crossing, WA
18.1 S 125.6 E 3-C
6 Australia NWAO
Narrogin, WA
32.9 S 117.2 E 3-C
7 Bangladesh CHT
Chittagong
22.4 N 91.8 E 3-C
8 Bolivia SIV
San Ignacio
16.0 S 61.1 W 3-C
9 Botswana LBTB
Lobatse
25.0 S  25.6 E 3-C
10 Brazil PTGA
Pitinga
0.7 S 60.0 W 3-C
11 Brazil RGNB
Rio Grande do Norte
6.9 S  37.0 W 3-C
12 Canada FRB
Iqaluit, N.W.T.
63.7 N 68.5 W 3-C
13 Canada DLBC
Dease Lake, B.C.
58.4 N 130.0 W 3-C
14 Canada SADO
Sadowa, Ont.
44.8 N 79.1 W 3-C
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
52 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
15 Canada BBB
Betla Bella, B.C.
52.2 N 128.1 W 3-C
16 Canada MBC
Mould Bay, N.W.T.
76.2 N 119.4 W 3-C
17 Canada INK
Inuvik, N.W.T.
68.3 N 133.5 W 3-C
18 Chile RPN
Easter Island
27.2 S 109.4 W 3-C
19 Chile LVC
Limon Verde
22.6 S 68.9 W 3-C
20 China BJT
Baijiatuan
40.0 N 116.2 E 3-C
21 China KMI
Kunming
25.2 N 102.8 E 3-C
22 China SSE
Sheshan
31.1 N 121.2 E 3-C
23 China XAN
Xi'an
34.0 N 108.9 E 3-C
24 Cook Islands RAR
Rarotonga
21.2 S  159.8 W 3-C
25 Costa Rica JTS
Las Juntas de 
Abangares
10.3 N 85.0 W 3-C
26 Czech Republic VRAC
Vranov
49.3 N 16.6 E 3-C
27 Denmark SFJ
Søndre Strømfjord, 
Greenland
67.0 N 50.6 W 3-C
28 Djibouti ATD
Arta Tunnel
11.5 N 42.9 E 3-C
29 Egypt KEG
Kottamya
29.9 N 31.8 E 3-C
30 Ethiopia FURI
Furi
8.9 N 38.7 E 3-C
31 Fiji MSVF
Monasavu, Viti Levu
17.8 S 178.1 E 3-C
32 France NOUC
Port Laguerre,
New Caledonia
22.1 S 166.3 E 3-C
33 France KOG
Kourou, French 
Guiana
5.2 N 52.7 W 3-C
34 Gabon BAMB
Bambay
1.7 S 13.6 E 3-C
35 Germany/South 
Africa
-
SANAE Station, 
Antarctica
71.7 S 2.9 W 3-C
36 Greece IDI
Anogia, Crete
35.3 N 24.9 E 3-C
37 Guatemala RDG
Rabir
15.0 N 90.5 W 3-C
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 53
38 Iceland BORG
Borgarnes
64.8 N 21.3 W 3-C
39 To be 
determined
To be determined To be 
determined
To be 
determined
To be 
determined
40 Indonesia PACI
Cibinong, Jawa Barat
6.5 S 107.0 E 3-C
41 Indonesia JAY
Jayapura, Irian Jaya 
2.5 S 140.7 E 3-C
42 Indonesia SWI
Sorong, Irian Jaya
0.9 S 131.3 E 3-C
43 Indonesia PSI
Parapat, Sumatera
2.7 N 98.9 E 3-C
44 Indonesia KAPI
Kappang, Sulawesi 
Selatan
5.0 S 119.8 E 3-C
45 Indonesia KUG
Kupang, 
Nusatenggara Timur
10.2 S 123.6 E 3-C
46 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
KRM
Kerman 
30.3 N 57.1 E 3-C
47 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
MSN
Masjed-e-Soleyman
31.9 N 49:3 E 3-C
48 Israel MBH
Eilath 
29.8 N 34.9 E 3-C
49 Israel PARD
Parod
32.6 N 35.3 E array
50 Italy ENAS
Enna, Sicily
37.5 N 14.3 E 3-C
51 Japan JNU
Ohita, Kyushu
33.1 N 130.9 E 3-C
52 Japan JOW
Kunigami, Okinawa 
26.8 N 128.3 E 3-C
53 Japan JHJ
Hachijojima, Izu 
Islands 
33.1 N 139.8 E 3-C
54 Japan JKA
Kamikawa-asahi, 
Hokkaido 
44.1 N 142.6 E 3-C
55 Japan JCJ
Chichijima, 
Ogasawara
27.1 N 142.2 E 3-C
56 Jordan  -
Ashqof
32.5 N  37.6 E 3-C
57 Kazakstan BRVK
Borovoye 
53.1 N 70.3 E array
58 Kazakstan KURK
Kurchatov
50.7 N 78.6 E array
59 Kazakstan  AKTO
Aktyubinsk
50.4 N 58.0 E 3-C
60 Kyrgyzstan AAK
Ala-Archa
42.6 N 74.5 E 3-C
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
54 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
61 Madagascar TAN
Antananarivo
18.9 S 47.6 E 3-C
62 Mali KOWA
Kowa
14.5 N 4.0 W 3-C
63 Mexico TEYM
Tepich, Yucatan
20.2 N 88.3 W 3-C
64 Mexico  TUVM
Tuzandepeti, 
Veracruz 
18.0 N 94.4 W 3-C
65 Mexico LPBM
La Paz, Baja 
California Sur
24.2 N 110.2 W 3-C
66 Morocco MDT
Midelt
32.8 N 4.6 W 3-C
67 Namibia TSUM
Tsumeb
19.1 S  17.4 E 3-C
68 Nepal EVN
Everest
28.0 N 86.8 E 3-C
69 New Zealand EWZ
Erewhon,
South Island
43.5 S 170.9 E 3-C
70 New Zealand  RAO
Raoul Island
29.2 S 177.9 W 3-C
71 New Zealand  UPZ 
Urewera, North Island
38.3 S 177.1 E 3-C
72 Norway SPITS
Spitsbergen
78.2 N 16.4 E array
73 Norway  JMI 
Jan Mayen
70.9 N 8.7 W 3-C
74 Oman WSAR
Wadi Sarin
23.0 N 58.0 E 3-C
75 Papua New 
Guinea
PMG
Port Moresby
9.4 S 147.2 E 3-C
76 Papua New 
Guinea
BIAL
Bialla
5.3 S 151.1 E 3-C
77 Peru CAJP
Cajamarca
7.0 S 78.0 W 3-C
78 Peru  NNA
Nana
12.0 S 76.8 W 3-C
79 Philippines DAV
Davao, Mindanao
7.1 N 125.6 E 3-C
80 Philippines TGY
Tagaytay, Luzon
14.1 N 120.9 E 3-C
81 Romania  MLR
Muntele Rosu
45.5 N 25.9 E 3-C
82 Russian 
Federation
KIRV
Kirov 83
58.6 N 49.4 E 3-C
83 Russian 
Federation
 KIVO
Kislovodsk
44.0 N 42.7 E array
84 Russian 
Federation
OBN
Obninsk
55.1 N 36.6 E 3-C
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 55
85 Russian 
Federation
 ARU
Arti
56.4 N 58.6 E 3-C
86 Russian 
Federation
SEY
Seymchan
62.9 N 152.4 E 3-C
87 Russian 
Federation
 TLY
Talaya
51.7 N 103.6 E 3-C
88 Russian 
Federation
 YAK
Yakutsk
62.0 N 129.7 E 3-C
89 Russian 
Federation
URG
Urgal
51.1 N 132.3 E 3-C
90 Russian 
Federation
 BIL
Bilibino
68.0 N 166.4 E 3-C
91 Russian 
Federation
 TIXI
Tiksi
71.6 N 128.9 E 3-C
92 Russian 
Federation
 YSS
Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk
47.0 N 142.8 E 3-C
93 Russian 
Federation
 MA2
Magadan
59.6 N 150.8 E 3-C
94 Russian 
Federation
 ZIL
Zilim
53.9 N 57.0 E 3-C
95 Samoa AFI
Afiamalu
13.9 S 171.8 W 3-C
96 Saudi Arabia  RAYN
Ar Rayn
23.6 N 45.6 E 3-C
97 Senegal  MBO
Mbour
14.4 N 17.0 W 3-C
98 Solomon 
Islands
HNR
Honiara, Guadalcanal
9.4 S 160.0 E 3-C
99 South Africa SUR
Sutherland
32.4 S 20.8 E 3-C
100 Sri Lanka  COC
Colombo
6.9 N 79.9 E 3-C
101 Sweden  HFS
Hagfors
60.1 N 13.7 E array
102 Switzerland  DAVOS
Davos
46.8 N 9.8 E 3-C
103 Uganda  MBRU
Mbarara
0.4 S 30.4 E 3-C
104 United 
Kingdom
EKA
Eskdalemuir
55.3 N 3.2 W array
105 United States of 
America
 GUMO
Guam, Marianas 
Islands
13.6 N 144.9 E 3-C
106 United States of 
America
 PMSA
Palmer Station, 
Antarctica
64.8 S 64.1 W 3-C
107 United States of 
America
 TKL
Tuckaleechee 
Caverns, TN
35.7 N 83.8 W 3-C
108 United States of 
America
 PFCA
Pinon Flat, CA
33.6 N 116.5 W 3-C
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
56 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
Table 2-A List of Radionuclide Stations
109 United States of 
America
 YBH
Yreka, CA
41.7 N 122.7 W 3-C
110 United States of 
America
 KDC
Kodiak Island, AK
57.8 N 152.5 W 3-C
111 United States of 
America
 ALQ
Albuquerque, NM
35.0 N 106.5 W 3-C
112 United States of 
America
 ATTU
Attu Island, AK
52.8 N 172.7 E 3-C
113 United States of 
America
 ELK
Elko, NV
40.7 N 115.2 W 3-C
114 United States of 
America
 SPA
South Pole, Antarctica 
90.0 S - - 3-C
115 United States of 
America
NEW
Newport, WA 116
48.3 N 117.1 W 3-C
116 United States of 
America
SJG
San Juan, PR
18.1 N 66.2 W 3-C
117 Venezuela SDV
Santo Domingo
8.9 N 70.6 W 3-C
118 Venezuela PCRV
Puerto la Cruz
10.2 N 64.6 W 3-C
119 Zambia LSZ
Lusaka
15.3 S 28.2 E 3-C
120 Zimbabwe BUL
Bulawayo
to be advised to be advised 3-C
State Responsible 
for Station
Location Latitude Longitude
1 Argentina Buenos Aires 34.0 S 58.0W
2 Argentina Salta 24.0 S 65.0 W
3 Argentina Bariloche 41.1 S 71.3 W
4 Australia Melbourne, VIC  37.5 S 144.6 E
5 Australia Mawson, Antarctica 67.6 S 62.5 E
6 Australia Townsville, QLD 19.2 S 146.8 E
7 Australia Macquarie Island 54.0 S 159.0 E
8 Australia  Cocos Islands  12.0 S 97.0 E
9 Australia Darwin, NT 12.4 S 130.7 E
10 Australia Perth, WA 31.9 S 116.0 E
11 Brazil Rio de Janeiro 22.5 S 43.1 W
12 Brazil Recife 8.0 S 35.0 W
13 Cameroon Douala 4.2 N 9.9 E
14 Canada Vancouver, B.C. 49.3 N 123.2 W
15 Canada Resolute, N.W.T. 74.7 N 94.9 W
16 Canada Yellowknife, N.W.T. 62.5 N 114.5 W
State 
Responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 57
17 Canada St. John’s, N.L. 47.0 N 53.0 W
18 Chile Punta Arenas 53.1 S  70.6 W
19 Chile Hanga Roa, Easter Island 27.1 S 108.4 W
20 China Beijing 39.8 N 116.2 E
21 China Lanzhou 35.8 N 103.3 E
22 China Guangzhou 23.0 N 113.3 E
23 Cook Islands Rarotonga 21.2 S 159.8 W
24 Ecuador Isla San Cristobal, 
Galápagos Islands
1.0 S 89.2 W
25 Ethiopia  Filtu 5.5 N 42.7 E
26 Fiji Nadi 18.0 S 177.5 E
27 France Papeete, Tahiti 17.0 S 150.0 W
28 France  Pointe-à-Pitre, 
Guadeloupe
17.0 N 62.0 W
29 France  Réunion 21.1 S 55.6 E
30 France Port-aux-Français, 
Kerguelen
49.0 S 70.0 E
31 France  Cayenne, French Guiana  5.0 N 52.0 W
32 France Dumont d’Urville, 
Antarctica
66.0 S 140.0 E
33 Germany Schauinsland/Freiburg 47.9 N 7.9 E
34 Iceland Reykjavik 64.4 N 21.9 W
35 To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined
36 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
Tehran 35.0 N 52.0 E
37 Japan Okinawa 26.5 N 127.9 E
38 Japan Takasaki, Gunma 36.3 N 139.0 E
39 Kiribati Kiritimati 2.0 N 157.0 W
40 Kuwait Kuwait City 29.0 N 48.0 E
41 Libya  Misratah 32.5 N 15.0 E
42 Malaysia  Kuala Lumpur 2.6 N 101.5 E
43 Mauritania  Nouakchott  18.0 N 17.0 W
44 Mexico  Baja California 28.0 N 113.0 W
45 Mongolia Ulaanbaatar 47.5 N 107.0 E
46 New Zealand Chatham Island 44.0 S 176.5 W
47 New Zealand Kaitaia 35.1 S 173.3 E
48 Niger Bilma 18.0 N 13.0 E
49 Norway Spitsbergen 78.2 N 16.4 E
50 Panama  Panama City 8.9 N 79.6 W
51 Papua New Guinea  New Hanover 3.0 S 150.0 E
52 Philippines  Quezon City 14.5 N 121.0 E
53 Portugal  Ponta Delgada,
Sao Miguel, Azores
37.4 N 25.4 W
54 Russian Federation Kirov 58.6 N 49.4 E
55 Russian Federation  Norilsk 69.0 N 88.0 E
56 Russian Federation Peleduy 59.6 N 112.6 E
State Responsible 
for Station
Location Latitude Longitude
58 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
Table 2-B List of Radionuclide Laboratories
57 Russian Federation Bilibino 68.0 N 166.4 E
58 Russian Federation  Ussuriysk 43.7 N 131.9 E
59 Russian Federation  Zalesovo 53.9 N 84.8 E
60 Russian Federation Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy
53.1 N 158.8 E
61 Russian Federation  Dubna 56.7 N 37.3 E
62 South Africa Marion Island 46.5 S 37.0 E
63 Sweden  Stockholm 59.4 N 18.0 E
64 Tanzania  Dar es Salaam 6.0 S 39.0 E
65 Thailand  Bangkok 13.8 N 100.5 E
66 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos 
Archipelago
7.0 S 72.0 E
67 United Kingdom  St. Helena 16.0 S 6.0 W
68 United Kingdom  Tristan de Cunha 37.0 S 12.3 W
69 United Kingdom  Halley, Antarctica 76.0 S  28.0 W
706 United States of 
America
Sacramento, CA 38.7 N 121.4 W
71 United States of 
America
 Sand Point, AK 55.0 N 160.0 W
72 United States of 
America
 Melboume, FL 28.3 N 80.6 W
73 United States of 
America
 Palmer Station, 
Antarctica
64.5 S 64.0 W
74 United States of 
America
 Ashland, KS 37.2 N 99.8 W
75 United States of 
America
 Charlottesville, VA 38.0 N 78.0 W
76 United States of 
America
 Salchaket, AK 64.4 N 147.1 W
77 United States of 
America
Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 E
78 United States of 
America
 Midway Islands 28.0 N 177.0 W
79 United States of 
America
 Oahu, HI 21.5 N 158.0 W
80 United States of 
America
 Upi, Guam 13.7 N 144.9 E
State responsible for 
Laboratory
Name and place of laboratory
1 Argentina National Board of Nuclear Regulation
Buenos Aires
2 Australia Australian Radiation Laboratory
Melbourne, VIC
3 Austria Austrian Research Center
Seibersdorf
State Responsible 
for Station
Location Latitude Longitude
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 59
Table 3 List of Hydroacoustic Stations
4 Brazil Institute of Radiation Protection and Dosimetry
Rio de Janeiro
5 Canada Health Canada
Ottawa, Ont.
6 China Beijing
7 Finland Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety
Helsinki
8 France Atomic Energy Commission
Montlhéry
9 Israel Soreq Nuclear Research Centre
Yavne
10 Italy Laboratory of the National Agency
for the Protection of the Environment
Rome
11 Japan Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute
Tokai, Ibaraki
12 New Zealand National Radiation Laboratory
Christchurch
13 Russian Federation Central Radiation Control Laboratory,
Ministry of Defence
Special Verification Service
Moscow
14 South Africa Atomic Energy Corporation
Pelindaba
15 United Kingdom AWE Blacknest
Chilton
16 United States of 
America
McClellan Central Laboratories
Sacramento, CA
State 
responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
1 Australia  Cape Leeuwin, WA 34.4 S 115.1 E Hydrophone
2 Canada Queen Charlotte 
Islands, B.C.
53.3 N 132.5 W T-phase
3 Chile Juan Fernández Island 33.7 S 78.8 W Hydrophone
4 France Crozet Islands 46.5 S 52.2 E Hydrophone
5 France Guadeloupe 16.3 N 61.1 W T-phase
6 Mexico Clarión Island 18.2 N 114.6 W T-phase
7 Portugal Flores 39.3 N 31.3 W T-phase
8 United 
Kingdom
BIOT/Chagos 
Archipelago
7.3 S 72.4 E Hydrophone
9 United 
Kingdom
Tristan de Cunha 7.3 S 12.5 W T-phase
State responsible for 
Laboratory
Name and place of laboratory
60 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
Table 4 List of Infrasound Stations
10 United States of 
America
Ascension 8.0 S 14.4 W Hydrophone
11 United States of 
America
Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 E Hydrophone
State Responsible 
for Station
Location Latitude Longitude
1 Argentina Paso Flores 40.7 S 70.6 W
2 Argentina  Ushuaia 55.0 S 68.0 W
3 Australia  Davis Base, Antarctica 68.4 S 77.6 E
4 Australia  Narrogin, WA 32.9 S 117.2 E
5 Australia Hobart, TAS 42.1 S 147.2 E
6 Australia  Cocos Islands 12.3 S 97.0 E
7 Australia Warramunga, NT 19.9 S 134.3 E
8 Bolivia  La Paz 16.3 S 68.1 W
9 Brazil  Brasilia 15.6 S 48.0 W
10 Canada  Lac du Bonnet, Man. 50.2 N 95.9 W
11 Cape Verde  Cape Verde Islands 16.0 N 24.0 W
12 Central African 
Republic
 Bangui 5.2 N 18.4 E
13 Chile  Easter Island 27.0 S 109.2 W
14 Chile  Juan Fernández Island 33.8 S 80.7 W
15 China  Beijing 40.0 N 116.0 E
16 China  Kunming 25.0 N 102.8 E
17 Cote d’Ivoire  Dimbokro 6.7 N 4.9 W
18 Denmark Dundas, Greenland 76.5 N 68.7 W
19 Djibouti Djibouti 11.3 N 43.5 E
20 Ecuador Galápagos Islands 0.0 N 91.7 W
21 France  Marquesas Islands 10.0 N 140.0 W
22 France  Port LaGuerre, New 
Caledonia
22.1 S 166.3 E
23 France  Kerguelen 49.2 S 69.1 E
24 France  Tahiti 17.6 S 149.6 W
25 France  Kourou, French Guiana 5.2 N 52.7 W
26 Germany  Freyung 48.9 N 13.7 E
27 Germany  Georg yon Neumayer, 
Antarctica
70.6 S 8.4 W
28  To be determined To be determined To be determined To be determined
29 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
 Tehran 35.7 N 51.4 E
30 Japan  Tsukuba 36.0 N 140.1 E
31 Kazakstan  Aktyubinsk 50.4 N 58.0 E
32 Kenya  Kilimanbogo 1.3 S 36.8 E
33 Madagascar  Antananarivo 18.8 S 47.5 E
State 
responsible for 
Station
Location Latitude Longitude Type
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY ġ S.L.365.11 61
ANNEX 2 TO THE PROTOCOL
List Of Characterisation Parameters for International Data Centre
Standard Event Screening
1. The International Data Centre standard event screening criteria shall be
based on the standard event characterisation parameters determined during the
combined processing of data from all the monitoring technologies in the
International Monitoring System. Standard event screening shall make use of both
global and supplementary screening criteria to take account of regional variations
where applicable.
34 Mongolia  Javhlant 48.0 N 106.8 E
35 Namibia  Tsumeb 19.1 S 17.4 E
36 New Zealand  Chatham Island 44.0 S 176.5 W
37 Norway  Karasjok 69.5 N 25.5 E
38 Pakistan  Rahimyar Khan 28.2 N 70.3 E
39 Palau  Palau 7.5 N 134.5 E
40 Papua New Guinea  Rabaul 4.1 S 152.1 E
41 Paraguay  Villa Florida 26.3 S 57.3 W
42 Portugal  Azores 37.8 N 25.5 W
43 Russian Federation  Dubna 56.7 N 37.3 E
44 Petropavlovsk-
Kamchatskiy
53.1 N 158.8 E
45 Russian Federation  Ussuriysk 43.7 N 131.9 E
46 Russian Federation  Zalesovo 53.9 N 84.8 E
47 South Africa  Boshof 28.6 S 25.4 E
48 Tunisia  Thala 35.6 N 8.7 E
49 United Kingdom  Tristan de Cunha 37.0 S 12.3 W
50 United Kingdom Ascension 8.0 S 14.3 W
51 United Kingdom Bermuda 32.0 N 64.5 W
52 United Kingdom BIOT/Chagos 
Archipelago
5.0 S 72.0 E
53 United States of 
America
Eielson, AK 64.8 N 146.9 W
54 United States of 
America
Siple Station, Antarctica 75.5 S 83.6 W
55 United States of 
America
Windless Bight, 
Antarctica
77.5 S 161.8 E
56 United States of 
America
Newport, WA 48.3 N 117.1 W
57 United States of 
America
Pinon Flat, CA 33.6 N 116.5 W
58 United States of 
America
Midway Islands 28.1 N 177.2 W
59 United States of 
America
Hawaii, HI 19.6 N 155.3 W
60 United States of 
America
Wake Island 19.3 N 166.6 E
State Responsible 
for Station
Location Latitude Longitude
62 ġ S.L.365.11 COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN TREATY
2. For events detected by the InternationaI Monitoring System seismic
component, the following parameters,  inter alia , may be used:
- location of the event;
- depth of the event;
- ratio of the magnitude of surface waves to body waves;
- signal frequency content;
- spectral ratios of phases;
- spectral scalloping;
- first motion of the P-wave;
- focal mechanism;
- relative excitation of seismic phases;
- comparative measures to other events and groups of events; and
- regional discriminants where applicable.
3. For events detected by the International Monitoring System hydroacoustic
component, the following parameters,  inter alia , may be used:
- signal frequency content including corner frequency, wide-band energy
and mean centre frequency and bandwidth;
- frequency-dependent duration of signals;
- spectral ratio; and
- indications of bubble-pulse signals and bubble-pulse delay.
4. For events detected by the International Monitoring System infrasound
component, the following parameters,  inter alia , may be used:
- signal frequency content and dispersion;
- signal duration; and
- peak amplitude.
5. For events detected by the International Monitoring System radionuclide
component, the following parameters,  inter alia , may be used:
- concentration of background natural and man-made radionuclides;
- concentration of specific fission and activation products outside normal
observations; and
- ratios of one specific fission and activation product to another.
